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PROPERTY AS GOVERNMENT IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA:
THE CASE OF NEW YORK CITY
HENDRIK HARTOG*
INTRODUCTION
FOR 150 years it has been the central premise of local government law
that legitimate governmental action is always distinctively public in
character. The most eminent modem student of local government law has
written that: "We know perfectly well, granting that there are inter-
mediate hard cases, how to distinguish governmental from nongov-
ernmental powers and forms of organization: governments are distin-
guished by their acknowledged, lawful authority-not dependent on
property ownership-to coerce a territorially defined and imperfectly
voluntary membership by acts of regulation, taxation, and condemna-
tion."1 The most eminent local government lawyer of an earlier genera-
tion declared that the distinction between public and private spheres
could not be "too much emphasized" 2 and founded his conception of a
properly public institution on its total dependence on a legislative delega-
tion of public authority.3 The assumption that local governments act as
governments only to the extent they decisively separate themselves from
the world of the marketplace and demonstrate their independence from
private sources of power and wealth lies deep within our collective per-
ceptions of the political and legal nature of communities in America.' We
all "know" that private wealth corrupts public authority and that the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. I am
indebted to Michael Grossberg, Morton Keller, William Nelson, and Susan Willey for read-
ing and commenting on earlier versions of this paper.
I Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty"
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L. J. 1165, 1167 (1977) (fn omitted).
2 John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 70 (1872).
3 Id. at 70-76 and passim.
I See Frank I. Michelman & Terence Sandalow, Materials on Government in Urban
Areas (1970), particularly at 155-97.
[The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume X, June 1981]
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boundaries of local authority are properly defined by the public power of
the state. 5
Indeed, the notion of an antinomic relationship between public and
private, the belief in a sharp division of our conceptural universe into
mutually exclusive spheres, has often appeared as a natural and inevitable
fact of legal life. In the case of New York City, this "fact" had been
established by 1826. That year Judge Savage of the New York Supreme
Court ruled that the capacity of the Corporation of the City of New York
to "purchase and hold, sell and convey real estate, in the same manner as
individuals" was absolutely unrelated to its activities as the government
of the city. 6 Governance was defined by the Corporation's powers and
duties as an agent of the state legislature; as a public institution, the
Corporation had no right to make any contract or agreement that would
"control or embarrass" its legislative responsibilities. Public welfare-
the goal of governmental action-could only be secured through dele-
gations of the public power of the sovereign state of New York.
By the second quarter of the nineteenth century such attitudes had
already become a kind of conventional wisdom. Even today it remains
difficult to formulate an alternative perception of the appropriate relation-
ship between governmental action and political sovereignty. 7 Yet, half a
century before the Brick Presbyterian Church case of 1826, an assertion of
the distinctively public and unpropertied character of New York City's
government would have been incomprehensible to those who ran that
government. In prerevolutionary New York City, governmental action
was based not on power derived from the provincial legislature, but on the
property rights granted to the city government by its royal charter. Prop-
erty authorized and legitimated the actions of the city; property, in fact,
permitted New York City's government to act in ways that were beyond
the reach of other, unchartered or unpropertied local governments. It was
the estate granted in its charters that shaped New York's relatively au-
tonomous relationship with external political authority. Likewise, it was
the active use of "private" wealth that allowed eighteenth-century city
government to satisfy the wants of a growing commercial city. How prop-
erty became a tool of city government and how the propertied actions
of New York City could be justified within the political culture of
eighteenth-century America are the subjects of this essay.
' People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161 (1907); Hendrik Hartog, Because All the World Was Not New York City: Gover-
nance, Property Rights, and the State in the Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730-1860,
28 Buffalo L. Rev. 91, 92-96 (1979).
6 Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
But see Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980).
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I. READING THE CHARTER
A. The Properties of the Charter
Let us begin with the fact that legally New York City was a corpora-
tion." It might be supposed that, as a corporation, New York City has
always been the same. In 1731 as in 1981 New York City was "an artificial
person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a
state or nation ... a body politic ... regarded as having a personality and
existence distinct from that of its several members." 9 Yet the constancy
of that definition should not mislead us. As a legal entity, New York City
underwent radical changes. The law-dictionary definition only hides the
depth of the conceptual transformation. In 1826 Judge Savage regarded
New York City primarily as a member of a general category of agencies of
public welfare; an eighteenth-century judge, by contrast, could only
have looked to the chartered foundations of a propertied corporation.
When our imaginary eighteenth-century judge searched for authority to
justify action by the institution, he would have had to turn to the charters
which created the city as a corporation. There was no general category of
public institutions. There were only the particular powers granted to the
singular institution of the city of New York by the various charters cul-
minating in the Montgomerie Charter of 1730.
To modem eyes the Montgomerie Charter is an awkward, prolix, and
repetitious document. The language is archaic, the structure mystifying. It
begins by reciting and incorporating the city's previous English charters
of 1686 (the Dongan Charter) and 1708 (the Cornbury ferry grant). It
finishes by announcing that the city will be free from any liability for the
use or misuse of powers or properties not granted by the charters.' 0
Throughout, it contains a seemingly disorganized series of grants from the
crown to the Corporation.
The need for a new charter arose because of the "diverse Questions
Doubts Opinions Ambiguities Controversies and Debates" concerning
the validity of the previous two charters, neither of which had been under
royal seal. " The purpose of the Montgomerie Charter therefore was both
' Throughout I shall indiscriminately use "the Corporation," "the city," or "New York
City," as referents for "The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York."
Note that I am thereby equating the city with the Corporation. I demonstrate that this is a
plausible equation in Part Two of this essay.
9 Black's Law Dictionary 409 (rev'd 4th ed. 1968).
10 For more on the significance of this release from liability see text at notes 44 & 45 infra.
" Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution 575, 596-97 (J. B.
Lyon edition 1894) [hereinafter cited as Colonial Laws]. [Copies of the Montgomerie charter
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to confirm what had been previously granted or acquired by the city and
to provide new powers and rights. "Considering that the Strength and
Encrease of our good Subjects in that our frontier province of New York
does in a greater measure depend upon the wellfare and properity of our
said City wherein the Trade and Navigation thereof are chiefly and princi-
pally carried on," the charter was drafted "to give Encouragement to the
said City Inhabitants and Citizens and to remove utterly abolish and
wholly take away all and all manner of Causes Occasions and matters
whereupon Such Questions Doubts Opinions Ambiguities Controversies
or Debates . . . may or can arise."' 2
What it granted can be divided into three categories. There were first
the incidents of corporate existence itself. The Mayor, Alderman, and
Commonalty were made "by force of these presents" one body corporate
and politic, with perpetual succession, the capacity to get, receive, and
possess all forms of property, to give, grant, let, or assign the same, and
to sue and be sued in courts of law "in as full and ample manner and form
as any of our other Liege Subjects of our Said Province." The charter
made the City a singular individual, a person like other persons capable of
holding property both within and without the city limits13 and a person
with a tangible and specific shape. New York City was given a head in the
creation of a structure of elective and appointive officers; it received a
body in the identification of the commonalty-the freeman and freehold-
ers of the city-with the interests of the Corporation. No free citizen of
the city could be compelled to serve on any jury, fill any office, or dis-
charge any public duty to any local government outside of the city. His
only local responsibilities were to the Corporation. Only the Corporation
could claim his allegiance.' 4
Secondly, and to city leaders most importantly, the charters confirmed
and extended the corporate estate of the city. External threats to the title
of the city had provided the impetus to petitions for a new charter. In 1708
it was the attempt by Cornelius Sebring of Brooklyn to establish a compet-
ing ferry across the East River in derogation of alleged rights of the city;
in 1730 it was the petition of Cornelius Van Home to the Governor for a
grant of a waterlot out beyond low water mark to build dock facilities.1 5 In
both of these cases city leaders gained the secure title they had sought.
are available in James Kent, The Charter of the City of New York... (1836, 1851); Colonial
Charters, Patents, and Grants to the Communities Comprising the City of New York (Jerrold
Seymann ed. 1939); and in many other editions published in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, as well as in the colonial laws. References throughout will be to Colonial Laws.]
12 Id.
13 Id. at 581, 587, 597.
14 Id. at 602-11, 615-16.
11 2 Minutes of the Common Council of the City of New York 1675-1776, at 341-45 (8 vols.
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The Montgomerie Charter gave them more than that, however. All the
"waste and common land" of Manhattan Island, which at the time in-
cluded most of the island north of what is now Canal Street, all the land
under water surrounding the island as far as low water mark plus an extra
400 feet beyond low water mark around the southern end of the island, a
ferry monopoly, all of the waterfront on the Long Island shore opposite
the city were granted in fee simple absolute to the Corporation of the city
of New York.
In addition, the Montgomerie Charter granted to the city what might be
regarded as a hodgepodge of public governmental powers. A common
council was given the power to pass such ordinances or by-laws "which
to them or the greater part of them Shall Seem to be good usefull or
necessary for the good rule and government of the body corporate."' 6
Specifically, the Charter authorized that body to pass regulations "for the
further publick good common proffit trade and better government and rule
of the Said City and for the better preserving governing disposing letting
and Setting of the Land Tenements possessions and hereditaments goods
and Chattels" of the Corporation. 1 7 The common council could investi-
gate and pass on the election of all officers of the Corporation (except for
the mayor who was appointed by the governor).' s It also had authority to
lay out and open streets, to run and regulate the markets of the city, to
regulate and license individuals in a variety of trades, and to appoint
inspectors for various goods. 19 The mayor of the city was made the clerk
of the market and the water bailiff for the harbor, in both cases with the
authority to collect all fees and rents without any need to account to the
agents of the crown. 20 The charter granted to the Corporation general
authority to erect and fill houses of correction (Bridewells), almshouses,
and jails. It also created two courts, both manned by officers of the Cor-
poration sitting as justices of the peace, one a court of general sessions of
the peace to hear criminal offenses, the other a court of common pleas or
Mayor's Court for civil actions. Each court was created with the authority
to act "as fully and freely and intirely and in as ample manner and form as
Justices of the peace of us and our Heirs and Successors anywhere within
that part of our Kingdom of great Britain called England." 21
1905) [hereinafter cited as Common Council] (ferry); 3 Common Council 221, 271-72, 278
(petition of Cornelius Van Home).
16 2 Colonial Laws 610.
17 Id. at 611.
I Id. at 612.
'I ld. at 613-17.
20 Id. at 618-19.
21 Id. at 620-23.
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B. Property and the Creation of Autonomy
What sort of an entity did the charter "create"? The corporation
created by the charter resembled no modern governmental entity. More to
the point, it resembled few governmental entities in eighteenth-century
North America. In the province of New York only Albany also governed
by virtue of a charter. No more than seventeen communities in all of
colonial America ever received corporate charters. Indeed, the Dongan
Charter of 1686 had been granted to give concrete affirmation by central
authority of the special status of New York City. According to his in-
structions from the Duke of York, Governor Dongan was to draft a char-
ter which would grant the city, "immunities and privileges beyond what
other parts of my territory doe enjoy.'"22
Even as a corporation among other corporations, New York City was
a singular institution. Like many historical statements, this seems
paradoxical until one realizes that it is actually tautological. For in the
eighteenth century what else could a corporation-be but a singular institu-
tion? Corporations were chartered with particular rights, properties,
privileges, and immunities to serve particular purposes. There was no
general categorization of different corporate entities. The often noted
confusion of Blackstone's discussion of corporations was an accurate
reflection of the corporate landscape of eighteenth-century England. To
Blackstone, "lay corporations" included the king, towns and cities, man-
ufacturing and commercial concerns like the "trading companies of Lon-
don," churchwardens, the college of physicians and company of surgeons
in London, the Royal Society, the society of antiquaries, Oxford, and
Cambridge.2 3 Each of these, as well as a great variety of others, was
defined not by its membership in a general category, but by its particular
property rights and privileges, by the specific terms of its charter.
So, New York was not a member of a general category of municipal
corporations sharing its status with Albany and Philadelphia. 4 It was a
particular institution defined by what it had been granted in its charter.
That New York City received "all the waste and common land of Man-
hattan Island," while Albany had been granted the monopoly of the fur
trade and the right to buy land from the Indians, served less to join them in
a common category of propertied corporate communities than to distin-
guish them by the specific natures of their respective grants . 25
22 Marcus Benjamin, Thomas Dongan and the Granting of the New York Charter,
1682-86, in Memorial History of the City of New York 411 (James Grant Wilson ed. 1892).
I William Blackstone, Commentaries, 459 (facsimile of 1st ed., Univ. of Chicago 1979).
24 See Judith M. Diamondstone, Philadelphia's Municipal Corporation 1701-1776, 90
Penn. Mag. of Hist. and Bio. 183-201 (1966).
25 Compare the Dongan Charter to Albany, 1 Colonial Laws 195-216, with the Dongan
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Our concern thus should be less with corporate nature in the abstract
than with the function of property in the creation of a corporate per-
sonality. Just as we say that an object is described by its properties, so in
the eighteenth century a person-whether an institution or a human
being-was described by his or her or its property.26 It was property, not
the political act of incorporation, which gave New York City and other
boroughs their political character.2 7
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, property, then, was a
guarantee of independence. Without it there was no protection from "the
political dependence upon others which constitutes corruption. ' 28 The
autonomy that property made possible was not simply a form of resis-
tance to interference. It was closely tied to the very possibility of an
individualized personality, to a classical notion of citizenship. Property
made it possible for a person to shape an identity rather than to be shaped
by external forces.
This notion contained an implicit tension. On the one hand, property
was seen as control and as a way to resist change imposed by external
authority. But property also implied change and instrumental action, the
shaping of an individual future. Yet change in and of itself was no virtue.
It was closely linked with instability and corruption and the disorder of
the English Civil Wars. All of the negative attributes of change were
closely identified with the crown and with central authority. The problem
for local governments, as for all persons who wished to retain their au-
tonomy, was to lay a basis for freedom from centralized control, to pro-
tect themselves from externally imposed "innovation.
2 1
Not all forms of property served equally well to guarantee the auton-
omy of the individual. Real property, by its permanence and its creation
of a spatial analogue for personal autonomy, had a preferred posi-
Charter to New York City incorporated into the Montgomerie Charter, 2 Colonial Laws,
575-90.
26 Indeed, it was their landholdings which had first driven medieval towns to seek charters
from the crown in the fourteenth century. See Colin Platt, The English Medieval Town 129,
142 (1976).
27 Indeed, Thomas Madox had taken great pains in Firma Burgi to demonstrate that
incorporation could not define or determine the relationships between boroughs and the
crown. There were important advantages held by incorporated towns over unincorporated
communities, but those advantages related to the internal governance and commerce of
cities, not to their partial autonomy within the eighteenth-century polity. Local autonomy,
insofar as it existed, was a reflection of the property held by boroughs. Thomas Madox,
Firma Burgi 37 ns. (1726).
21 J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time 92 (1973).
29 Consider the words of Recorder Treby, defending the City of London against the quo
w'arranto action by the Crown in 1682:
"... all innovations (as this must certainly be a very great one) are dangerous."
8 Howell's State Trials 1039. 1143.
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tion.30 But all types of property that were not transitory or easily aliena-
ble, that were in some measure permanently identifiable with the identity
of an individual might protect autonomy. When the Dongan Charter of
1686 spoke of New York City as "an Antient City" that had "antiently
been a body Politick and Corporate" and when it confirmed all of the
"Liberties privileges ffranchises rights Royalties ffree Customs Jurisdic-
tions and Immunities which they... antiently had held, ' 31 the effect was
to assert the Corporation's preexisting claim to properties for which there
was no formal grant or charter, to assert title by prescription. But pre-
scriptive title was not simply an archaic alternative to adverse possession.
A prescriptive right-an anciently held right-was a virtuous, a politi-
cally significant right. It was a form of property that could be interposed
against change and corruption. It was property that articulated the per-
sonality of the holder. 32
The English history of New York City prior to the granting of the
Montgomerie Charter in 1730 was marked by a continuing tension be-
tween the desires of the members of the Corporation for new and greater
grants from provincial and royal authorities and their inclination to assert
forms of preexisting or prescriptive title. Consider two episodes in the
history of New York City's claim on the ferry franchise. In September
1683, prior to the Dongan Charter, the Mayor and Aldermen submitted to
Governor Dongan one of a number of petitions in which they asked for
confirmation of a variety of "privileges" of the Corporation, including the
franchise in ferries to Long Island. The governor responded with some
exasperation at the unending stream of demands made on him by the
Corporation ("that he much wondered [that] having lately granted almost
every particular of a large and considerable petition Lately preferred by
[the] preceeding Mayor [and] aldermen he should so suddenly Receive
another petition ffrom [the] present Magistrates"), and he denied many of
the city's requests. In particular he restricted the city's rights over ferries
"in any other place but what is already," seemingly a denial of the city's
right to a franchise-a monopoly-in the ferry to Long Island. A com-
mittee was immediately appointed by the common council to entreat the
30 Pocock, supra note 28, at 91; See also the wish-list of New York City in the petition for
a new charter in which real property grants-the extension of the bands and limits of the city
to 400 feet beyond low water mark, the ferry franchise, and all the docks, ships, and wharves
with cranage and wharfage-are given priority over all other things to be desired from the
Crown. 4 Common Council, supra note 15, at 6-7 (1730).
31 2 Colonial Laws 575, 577.
32 On the political significance of customary and prescriptive forms of tenure see E. P.
Thompson, The Grid of Inheritance; in Family and Inheritance 328-60 (Jack Goody, Joan
Thirsk, & E. P. Thompson eds. 1976). For the later history of title by prescription, see
Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 43-47 (1977).
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governor to remove such restrictions. In March of the following year the
restrictions imposed by the governor's letter were removed. They were,
wrote Dongan, intended merely as "directions not as Tenure. ' 33
Tenure-the property right in the ferry franchise-was held by the Cor-
poration as a preexisting right, beyond the reach of central authority.
In January 1708 Cornelius Sebring of Kings County (Brooklyn)
petitioned then Governor Cornbury to be granted the right to run a ferry
from his farm on Long Island to the city in competition with the Corpora-
tion. The petition was underwritten by forty individuals who believed
"that such a ferry would be of a considerable advantage to the City &
County if the Prises for Transportacon be not excessive," and the chal-
lenge was taken very seriously by the Corporation which immediately
remonstrated to the governor. "[T]he inhabitants of the city and corpora-
tion," have "peaceably and quietly Possess'd and Enjoy'd" the various
rights and properties granted to them by both the English and the Dutch
for over seventy years, "to the great increase of her Majestys Revenue
and the Sencible Growth and Advancement of her Majestys said City and
Province." Among those various properties, the ferry between the city
and Long Island had a preeminent place. The Corporation had spent much
in erecting several public buildings that rendered service "commodious."
No one had ever complained about the service. The profits had al-
ways been applied to the government of the city and were "the only con-
siderable Income left to support the public buildings Bridges Goals
Landing places fire and Candle for their Watches, Sallaryes of their
officers Bellmen &c, and to defray the other publick and necessary
Charges of the Said City." But, the competing ferry proposed by Sebring
"for his own private Lucre and gain" would "make Considerable Im-
provements to Ruine and destroy the present ferry the Chief Income and
Support of this Corporation." Therefore, because "you [Cornbury] will
Ever prefer the publick welfare of so Loyall and Considerable a People as
this Corporation," the petition of Sebring should be rejected. 34
The argument made by the Corporation-successfully one might
add-was that its rights in the ferry were not simply those of a private
owner, but rather of a piece with its existence as a flourishing and useful
governmental institution. Governance and ownership were intertwined in
the conception of the ferry franchise. The city had been shaped by its
seventy years of possession of an exclusive franchise, and the "improve-
ments" that might result from competition would destroy this element of
its personality.
3 1 Common Council 111, 121, 127.
" 3 Edmond B. O'Callaghan, Documentary History of the State of New York 25-26
(1849); 2 Common Council 341-44.
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The common council proceeded to petition Cornbury for an enlargement
and an absolute confirmation of the grant to the Corporation. By securing
both "all the Vacant and unappropriated Ground on Nassaw Island [Long
Island] from High water to Low water marke fronting unto this City" and
an exclusive franchise in the ferry, the city hoped to prevent competition
from future Cornelius Sebrings and "to hinder and prevent that priviledge
and Liberty which divers persons now take of Transporting themselves
and goods to and from the Island of Nassaw over the Said River without
Coming to or Landing at the usual and accustomed place where the said
ferry Boats are kept and Appointed to the great loss and damage of the
petitioners.'"35
The result was the Cornbury Charter, which granted the city all the real
property it had requested (the exclusive franchise and the shoreline of
Long Island), but which refused to forbid residents from transporting
themselves across the river. The ferry, began the Cornbury charter, was
held by the city under "diverse antiant Charters and grants by diverse
former Governours and Commanders in chief of our said Province." But
the profits thereof had declined because of the inability of the city to
control and exclude competition. 36 Thus the enlargement of the grant by
the 1708 charter only made effectual and secure the preexisting ancient
claim. But the right of residents of Long Island to transport themselves
across the harbour was itself an ancient preexisting right, a prescriptive
easement in the property of the corporation. It was, one might say, for-
mative of the personality and the autonomy of the inhabitants of Long
Island and, therefore, as inviolate as the title of the Corporation.
The rights granted in the charters of the city of New York did not
belong to some archetypal archaic world of customary tenure and hazy
group personality. To the contrary, those rights need to be located in an
age of great legal change and conflict. Prescriptive, customary forms of
tenure were under constant attack throughout the eighteenth century. As
E. P. Thompson has written, "Small victories.., in defence of customary
practice, were won here and there. But the campaign itself was always
lost." 37 The grants made in the charters to the Corporation of the city of
New York derived their authority less from the references to "antient"
practices than from the fact that those charters transformed preexisting
claims into rights held by the city in fee simple absolute, the absolute
property of the Corporation.
38
35 Id.
36 2 Colonial Laws, 591.
37 Thompson, supra note 32, at 348.
3 For example, the waste and vacant land of Manhattan Island, first granted to the city in
the Dongan Charter of 1686, became the "commons" of the city. But the grant of that vast
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The ability of property to determine the autonomy of a corporation
rested, moreover, not on some timeless "essence" of corporateness;
rather, it was fixed by the peculiar history of borough charters, franchises,
and privileges in the last twenty years of the seventeenth century. In 1680,
Charles II began a campaign to change the face of Parliament by forcing
the boroughs to return less whiggish representatives. The strategy
adopted was to threaten an action quo warranto to compel the boroughs
to come to court to defend themselves against charges of misuser of their
franchises if they would not agree to terms with the crown. The lynchpin
of this strategy, at least according to later "whig" historians, was the
famous quo warranto action that was actually brought against the city of
London, a seat of opposition sentiment. London would be compelled to
return its charter to the crown, to give up all its chartered properties
through the action; the case would "reduce the City of London to the
status of a small village, . . . place its government entirely in its [the
Crown's] own hands and . . . strip it of all rights and privileges." 3 9
In the short run, the strategy worked. Judgment was given for the
crown (although the city never actually gave up its charter), and most
other boroughs quickly capitulated and returned their charters to the
crown. By early 1688, however, a desperate James II was forced to issue
"A Proclamation for restoring Corporations to their Ancient Charters,
Liberties, Rights and Franchises." ,40 And after the Glorious Revolution the
arguments of Recorder Treby and Pollexfen for the London Corporation
became enshrined as constitutional gospel.
The year 1688 "sanctified" the privileges of English boroughs by mak-
ing them into unquestionable "vested rights. ' 41 In England this meant
that borough officers might become increasingly corrupt in their use of
corporate property and separate corporate rights in the wealth of the
"commons," extending over the greater portion of Manhattan Island, gave no use-rights in
that land to the inhabitants of the city. The commons was considered part of the estate of the
Corporation, as a corporation. Unlike some contemporary boroughs in England, freemen
held no "right of common"--no right to pasture their animals, gather firewood, and so
forth-as a privilege of their freemanship. See the examples collected by Frederick W.
Maitland in Township and Borough 197 (1899). The common council, acting for the Corpo-
ration, managed its estate to the exclusion of any "common" rights; to the Corporation the
commons was simply a large piece of real estate absolutely owned. And through the first
seventy-five years of the eighteenth century the common council leased plots, prosecuted
trespassers, and tore down encroachments, all to the end of conserving the value of the
property. See 1 Common Council 403; 2 Common Council 97-98, 113, 127, 129, 258-59; 3
Common Council 229-30, 240-41, 245.
11 Jennifer Levin, The Charter Controversy in the City of London, 1660-1688, and Its
Consequences 2 (1969); see also Michael Landon, The Triumph of the Lawyers (1970).
40 8 Howell's State Trials 1039, 1277-78.
4 Frederick W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in Selected Essays 217 (1936).
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community from any perceivable public purpose, yet remain beyond
any form of central control. 42 The central government responded by
shifting much of the governmental responsibilities-the public services
-of local government to statutory commissions and other derivative
agencies, making boroughs as irrelevant as possible to the necessary
processes of local government. But full intervention into borough life had
to await the formulation of a conception of corporate personality that
was not dependent on property rights, had to await the separation of the
sanctified "connection between corporateness and privilege." 43
The language used in the Montgomerie Charter of 1730 must be re-
garded as a direct legacy of the charter controversies of the 1680s. The last
five pages of the document declared that the Crown would never sue New
York City in an action "quo warranto." The properties granted by the
charter were held in fee simple absolute, beyond the reach of attacks for
misuser; the city was free to use them as it pleased. Nor would other
properties, however acquired and however used in the past by the Corpo-
ration, raise an action "quo warranto."4 Indeed, one might argue that
one purpose of the charter was to assure the autonomy of the city in the
manner of an eighteenth-century English borough, as an institution whose
properties were sacrosanct. "[B]y these presents," by the various grants
of property contained in the charter, the charter drafters proposed to
constitute New York City as "a free City of itself." 45 Unlike London, the
city of New York could never have claimed perpetual existence as a basis
of legitimacy, for it had an identifiable point of origin. But it no longer
needed to assert the "antient" quality of its privileges. In the wake of the
Glorious Revolution, rights granted by the crown in a formal charter
would be sufficient to make New York "a free city of itself."
This is not to say that there were not important theoretical and practical
limitations on the autonomy of the corporation. The charter should not be
read as creating a complete blueprint for governance. In a variety of ways,
the city of New York remained dependent on the provincial government.
Two limitations in particular should be mentioned. The governor retained
the right to appoint the mayor, and the provincial legislature was the only
body capable of ordering direct taxation. In the first case one must pre-
sume that the retention of the power of appointment by the governor was
consciously intended as a limitation on the autonomy of the city; indeed,
42 Consider, for example, the member of the Cambridge Corporation who thought, "that
the property [of the corporation] belonged bona fide to the corporation and that they had a
right to do what they pleased with their own." Maitland, supra note 38, at 12-13.
13 Maitland, supra note 41, at 217.
" 2 Colonial Laws 635-39.
4. Id. at 597.
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the petition of the common council to Montgomerie for a new charter in
1730 had specifically asked for the power to elect a mayor.
The second limitation presents a more ambiguous picture. On the one
hand, it is hard to imagine a more direct denial of local autonomy than for
central authority to retain absolute control of taxation. On the other hand,
until the 1760s direct taxation was only rarely used by the Corporation as
a revenue source. 46 There were only four occasions between 1731 and
1750 when the need for revenue was so great that city officials had to seek
authorization from the legislature to lay a tax. 47 Rents and other corporate
revenues were usually sufficient for the purposes of municipal gover-
nance, and we might guess that the existence of a "freely disposable
income" from the properties it had been granted gave the Corporation
concrete affirmation of its autonomous status within the province.
48
Still, in many respects the city remained the "political child of the
province. ' 49 Authorization to repair or build new streets always came
from the provincial legislature, as did a variety of police regulations;
ferriage rates and other rate structures were usually set outside the city.
The Mayor's Court, which one might assume would have retained a sepa-
rate style of decision making, by the 1730s had become simply a court of
common pleas for the city whose decisions and practices were largely
indistinguishable from those of county courts elsewhere. 50 It is not at all
clear whether these restrictions on the autonomy of the city developed in
opposition to the articulated interests of city officials. We might suspect
that most of the legislation was passed at the instigation of the representa-
tives from the city. There is in any case a growing recognition among
historians of colonial New York political life that from the time that En-
glish control of the province was secured New York City dominated the
political life of the province. 51 Still, the government of the city was closely
integrated with the general governance of the province, and the autonomy
granted by the charter was always partial and incomplete.
The very political theory which joined property with political autonomy
also placed limits on that joinder. Property gave a corporation the right to
46 George William Edwards, New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality 197-99
(1917) [hereinafter cited as Edwards, Municipality].
47 2 Colonial Laws 1061-63; 3 Colonial Laws 158-62, 542, 619-20.
'8 Maitland, supra note 41, at 204-05.
49 Jacob Judd, New York: Municipality and Province, in Aspects of Early New York
Society and Politics 2 (J. Judd & I. Polishook eds. 1974).
50 Herbert A. Johnson, The Advent of Common Law in Colonial New York, in Law and
Authority in Colonial America 83 (George A. Bilias ed. 1965); see generally Select Cases of
the Mayors Court of New York City (R. B. Morris ed. 1935).
5' See Robert C. Ritchie, The Duke's Province (1977).
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control its own affairs free of systematic external interference. But that
autonomy was always derivative and dependent. Property rights did not
justify disobedience. To the contrary, Locke had written "that every man
that has any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of
any government does thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth
obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoy-
ment, as anyone under it."' 52 New York City may have been a "free
city of itself," but it was "of itself" only in relation to those areas of gov-
ernance defined by its property rights, and even there its dominion could
never be severed from the intermittent interference of central authority.
On the other hand, the eighteenth-century chartered city of New York
was not a municipal corporation, at least not as we would understand the
term today. In his classic discussion of New York City as an eighteenth-
century municipality, George William Edwards wrote:
But we must remember that as an eighteenth-century municipality it was merely
an agent of the provincial government, devised, as Goodnow aptly says, "for the
discharge of those functions interesting the state government which demanded
local treatment." It is therefore always necessary to be mindful of this dependent
position of a municipal corporation as we view its relations to the provincial
government.5
He was wrong. Intermittent intervention by the legislature did not
define the nature of the Corporation. Property did. The property rights of
the eighteenth-century city were not tangential to the nature of the in-
stitution. As defined and described in the Montgomerie Charter they were
what constituted its corporate personality. Today we may know "per-
fectly well" how to distinguish governmental from nongovernmental in
terms of the use and ownership of property, but in the eighteenth century
our task would have been complicated by the peculiar presence of prop-
ertied "governmental" corporations like the Mayor, Aldermen, and
Commonalty of the city of New York.
II. PROPERTY AND GOVERNANCE IN PREREVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK
A. The Business of a Corporation
Earlier students of the institutional history of eighteenth-century New
York have regarded the property acquired under the charters of the city
as important only for the revenue it provided for the administration of city
affairs. In so doing they underestimated the important role corporate
property played in creating distinctive forms of municipal governance. Of
52 John Locke, The Second Treatise on Government, § 119.
'3 Edwards, Municipality, supra note 46, at 34.
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course the need for new revenue offers one explanation for the common
council's decision to apply for new grants in a new charter in the 1720s.1
And the income from corporate property did assume a significant place in
municipal finances throughout the prerevolutionary period: making taxes
little needed until the 1750s, keeping the tax rate low thereafter, and
giving the city ready collateral whenever it needed to borrow funds."" But
the existence of a freely disposable income scarcely exhausted the uses of
property in the life of the Corporation. As we have seen, the property
granted by the city's charters legitimated and defined a sphere of local
autonomy; property rights guaranteed the individuality of the city. The
estate of the city also created a possibility of planning, growth, and inno-
vation on a scale unavailable to unchartered and unpropertied local gov-
ernments, a possibility at least partially realized in the practice of gov-
ernment in New York City. The relative autonomy created by the
During the decade prior to the reception of the Montgomerie Charter the revenue of the
city declined from a high of 731 pounds in 1722 to an average well below 300 pounds. See
David Valentine, Financial History of the City of New-York, from the Earliest Period, in
Valentine's Manual of the Corporation of the City of New-York 506 (1859). And it was a
perception that only a new charter could provide new revenue for the Corporation that
seems to have spurred the common council to apply to the governor of the province. For
more on this, see text at notes 88-90 infra.
' The most complete and reliable account of the finances of the eighteenth-century city is
in Edwards, Municipality, supra note 46, at 190-205. Edwards offers the following tale of the
returns from the revenue-bearing properties and franchises of the Corporation:
MUNICIPAL REVENUE FROM FRANCHISES AND PROPERTIES IN POUNDS,
OVER FIVE-YEAR PERIODS
Ferries Docks Markets Lands Waterlots Buildings Licenses
1730... £246 ... ... £ 28 ... ... £ 91
1735... 243 ... ... 5 £ 33 £ 2 89
1740... 307 £ 73 "" 7 65 2
1745... 370 90 £105 7 68 2 194
1750... 455 110 159 7 99 5 180
1755... 650 305 190 40 142 50 172
1760... 650 500 245 122 196 50 524
1765... 800 550 385 501 225 100 180
1770... 970 690 250 374 460 60 230
Id. at 191. (Slightly different figures for 1740 may be found in Valentine, supra note 54, at
507.)
Although Edwards argues the case for the growing dependence of the city on tax powers
that could only be delegated by the provincial legislature, even he concedes that, "For many
years the returns from the revenue-bearing properties and franchises of the corporation
were barely sufficient to meet expenses." Id. See also Edward Durand, The Finances of
New York City 7-40 (1898); George Ashton Black, Municipal Ownership of Land on Man-
hattan Island (1891); and Sidney I. Pomerantz, New York: An American City 1783-1803 (2d
ed. 1965).
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Montgomerie Charter and its predecessors was not meant simply as pro-
tection from external interference; it also bestowed a freedom to act. In
effect, the charter constituted a license to initiate change, a liberation
from the commitment to a consensually determined status quo that
characterized most local government in provincial America.5 '6 The prop-
erty rights granted in the Montgomerie Charter were granted in pursuit of
the goal of creating a major seaport in New York City. In protecting the
Corporation of the city of New York from the harm of externally imposed
change, the charter also laid the basis for internally instituted innovation.
This position would sharply separate the institutional history of
eighteenth-century New York City from two major interpretations of the
history of the American city. One interpretation, closely identified with
the writings of Sam Bass Warner, asserts that the history of the American
city has always been shaped by a culture of privatism. American cities
were the products not of community planning or public initiative but of
the individual decisions of individualistic Americans. "[T]he physical
forms of American cities, their lots, houses, factories, and streets have
been the outcome of a real estate market of profitseeking builders, land
speculators, and large investors." 57 Government has always been inade-
quate; indeed, it usually has been irrelevant to the main processes of
growth and change. According to Warner, even before the Revolution the
sphere of public action was limited and separated from the economic life
of the American city.
By contrast, another interpretation, one most recently restated by Jon
Teaford, views the early American city as a reflection of the regulatory
traditions and practices of the medieval English borough. The chartered
corporation was introduced into the colonies as a way of controlling and
fostering commercial life. Until the Revolution, American city govern-
ment-with the exception of the unchartered "town" of Boston-had
no proper sphere of activity but the regulation of economic activity.5
These two interpretations offer dramatically different perspectives on
our urban past 9.5 They converge, however, in their general picture of
3 See Part II-C infra.
0 Sam Bass Warner, The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth 4
(1968).
" Jon Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America (1975). One finds here strong
echoes of the perspective of the authors of the institutional studies of urban government that
flourished in the early twentieth century. See, for example, Robert Francis Seybolt, The
Colonial Citizen of New York City (1918), subtitled, A Comparative Study of Certain As-
pects of Citizenship Practice in Fourteenth Century England and Colonial New York City.
" According to Teaford, the postrevolutionary era witnessed the triumph of a "public
welfare" theory of urban governance which entirely eclipsed the earlier commercial focus of
the premodern chartered corporation. Warner, more pessimistic, argued that there is a
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mid-eighteenth-century urban governance. According to Teaford, the
spread of libertarianism during the middle years of the eighteenth century
weakened the regulatory control of municipal corporations and necessi-
tated a partial withdrawal by urban authorities from their traditional fields
of primary authority. In a few cases their attention shifted to newer areas
of health and safety regulation and public works. But in other cases,
municipal corporations "reacted to change with lethargy and indif-
ference."16 0 The middle of the eighteenth century should, therefore, be
regarded as a transitional period when urban government was separated
from an increasingly private market economy but had not yet fixed on a
modern conception of its role in urban life.
Warner undoubtedly would agree with that characterization of eigh-
teenth-century practice, although for him the absence of a proper pub-
lic role is a more or less permanent feature of American cities. The
Philadelphia of Revolutionary America that is his model of a "private
city" had
a regime of little government. Both in form and function the town's government
advertised the lack of concern for public management of the community. The
municipal corporation of Philadelphia, copied from the forms of an old English
borough, counted for little....
By modern standards the town was hardly governed at all.6
To both Teaford and Warner the chartered corporate governments of
early modern America were fast becoming-or had already become-
anachronisms irrelevant to the communities they were presumably in-
tended to serve.
Philadelphia provides the model of eighteenth-century corporate gov-
ernment for both Teaford and Warner, and they may have correctly
identified features of Philadelphia's corporate life that typified eigh-
teenth-century American municipal behavior generally. In several re-
spects, however, the government of New York City was very different
from that of Philadelphia. New York's Corporation remained inextricably
identified with the city it was chartered to govern. While the "close" cor-
poration of Philadelphia effectively excluded most residents of the city from
participation in its affairs, the Montgomerie Charter made the Corpora-
tion of New York into a classically "open" organization. Anyone might
be admitted as a freeman, as a politically active member of the Corpora-
depressing continuity in America urban history defined by our continuing commitment to a
culture of privatism. A moment's reflection suggests the truism that both positions might
be--and probably are-equally true as perspectives on our urban past.
6o Teaford, supra note 58, at 56.
1 Warner, supra note 57, at 10.
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tion. 62 In 1731 the cost of becoming a freeman of the city was set at three
pounds for merchants or shopkeepers and twenty shillings for craftsmen,
but the common council could and did grant the privilege gratis to any
resident who could not pay. 63 The result was that in New York City "the
Commonalty" of the Corporation became in effect the entire populace of
the city, or at least the white male populace, while in Philadelphia "the
Commonalty" of the Corporation was a distinct community, a particular
identifiable elite, within the larger city.
Throughout the eighteenth century, moreover, the Corporation of New
York remained the government of all aspects of city life subject to public
control. Unlike what was the case in Philadelphia, there were no statutory
authorities in New York. Even most voluntary associations were under
Corporation sponsorship. Where public action was necessary, it occurred
under the auspices of the Corporation, or it did not occur at all. And well
into the nineteenth century New Yorkers could speak of "our Corpora-
tion" when they referred to the government of their city. 64 The separation
of government from corporation that seems to have characterized
eighteenth-century Philadelphia occurred much later in New York City.
The issue is not, though, the marginal differences between Philadelphia
and New York City. The issue is how one ought to evaluate the utility and
effectuality of corporate government in eighteenth-century America. Was
New York City "a regime of little government" like Warner's Philadel-
phia, or was it rather a regime whose government can only be understood
if we put aside our conventional expectations about the nature of a public
sphere?
Teaford has used what he calls a "content analysis" of ordinances to
argue that there was a moderate decline in the concern with commercial
regulation in cities throughout provincial America. By his calculations,
where 54 percent of New York City's ordinances dealt with trade or
commerce in 1707, only 47.6 percent did so in 1773.65 But all forms of
legislative activity-and ordinances in particular-have weaknesses
62 Milton Klein, Democracy and Politics in Colonial New York, in The Politics of Diver-
sity: Essays in Honor of Colonial New York 20-25 (Milton M. Klein ed. 1974), Beverly
McAnear, The Place of the Freeman in Old New York, 21 N.Y. Hist. 418 (1940).
63 4 Common Council 96-97; for the equivalent rates for 1702 and 1751 see 2 Common
Council 198-99; and 5 Common Council 326.
4 See Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years 17 (1962).
This is not to deny that eighteenth-century New Yorkers could distinguish their in-
dividual interests from that of the Corporation whenever the two diverged. When Cor-
nelius Sebring applied to the crown's officials for a grant of a competing ferry, prior to the
grant of the ferry franchise in 1708, his petition was accompanied by a supporting letter from
a number of residents of the city. 3 O'Callaghan, supra note 34, at 256.
65 Teaford, supra note 58, at 18-52.
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when used to define the concerns of a governmental institution. 66
Teaford's statistics in fact unquestionably understate the disinterest of the
midcentury common council of New York City in commercial regulation.
If one looks at the minutes of the council, the record of its ordinary
activity, it becomes apparent that trade regulation consumed a miniscule
proportion of the worktime of the council. Of some 97 entries into the
minutes in 1737, no more than 9 can in any way be characterized as
dealing with the regulation of trade and commerce, and in the case of 4
entries it is unclear whether the measures ordered by the council were
intended to achieve goals of the promotion or control of economic life in
66 Teaford's expectation that an analysis of the subject matter of ordinances would reveal
the nature of a corporation is, I think, fundamentally flawed as a research strategy:
(a) Legislative activity is inherently ambiguous. Is legislation passed because legislators
feel the need to act in a particular area or is legislation passed as a substitute for action, as a
form of symbolic politics? The fact that Philadelphia passed almost no new ordinances
between 1740 and 1776 might stand as easily as evidence for the effectiveness of its regu-
latory structure as for Teaford's presumption of a quiescent government. There is moreover
no way from Teaford's narrative to learn anything about enforcement patterns. Is legislation
passed because it is expected to validate ideological presuppositions of what a municipal
corporation ought to be doing? It might be, in fact, that the by-laws of the corporations
Teaford has studied reveal the survival of an archaic ideology of a commercial community
long after the actual practice of local government in those communities has changed in rather
dramatic ways.
(b) Even on its own terms there is reason to question Teaford's statistics. His tables
represent a "title" or subject matter analysis of corporate by-laws rather than a "content
analysis." He assumes that titles of ordinances reflect the content of those ordinances, but
in eighteenth-century New York City that was certainly not the case. What New Yorkers
referred to as the "nuisance" ordinance was entitled, "A Law for paving and cleaning the
Streets, Lanes and Alleys within the city of New-York, and for preventing Nuisances within
the same." By 1763 it had seventeen sections, including rules on disposal of manure and
offal, wages for cartmen, restrictions on the location of tanneries, dyers, starchmakers, and
slaughterhouse, ("because the Health of the Inhabitants of this City, does in a great Measure
depend upon the purity of the Air of that City") as well as a prescription of the dates during
which shellfish might be sold in the city. New York City legislators had not yet "learned"
the modern rule of legislative drafting that there should be only a single subject for each title
of legislation. The number of by-laws passed in particular areas of concern probably does
not reflect the actual incidence of attention by the Common Council. And the percentages
Teaford gives may bear no relationship to the actual content of legislation. It appears, for
example, that most trade regulation by-laws consisted of a single section. If one factored in
the disparate sections of the nuisance ordinance and of other public regulations, the percent-
ages of his tables would have been very different. Public or health regulation might have
seemed at all times a weightier part of the business of the corporation. What is a law is an
unavoidable question for anyone who writes legal history.
(c) Finally, reliance on ordinances creates the false impression that the proper business of
a government is necessarily some form of regulation. For Teaford the history of the munici-
pal corporation in America is one of the choice between trade regulation and health and
safety regulation. But it is equally possible that government might be concerned with differ-
ent questions or, more precisely, might be pursuing governmental ends through nonregula-
tory techniques. Teaford's methodology forces him to consider that which is nonregulatory
in the affairs of an eighteenth-century city as almost necessarily nongovernmental.
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the city, or were intended for some other governmental purpose.6 7 Simi-
larly, in 1767 only 11 of 157 entries had anything to do with commercial
regulation. 68
Indeed, we may wonder if the "medieval" notion of a city as an exclu-
sive, monopolistic, commercial community had any legal significance in
the life of the Corporation of the city of New York after the reception of
the Montgomerie Charter. The members of the common council made no
attempt to preserve city trade for city residents, much to the dismay of
local retailers-particularly butchers and fresh produce vendors-who
felt victimized by the "Country People who rented stalls in city markets
and undersold the local competition.6" Consider also the oath given to
newly admitted freemen. In 1707 the common council had authorized a
version which closely paralleled a fourteenth-century oath used by the
corporation authorities of the city of London.70 Among other things it
ordered the new freeman to warn the mayor whenever he heard of "For-
reigners" (or nonresidents) buying or selling within the city boundaries,
forbade him from suing any other freeman of the city in a court outside of
the city, and prescribed the terms under which he would take and care for
apprentices. 7' In 1731, after the reception of the new charter, the council
drew up a new oath which eliminated all references to the commercial life
of the city and to the particular significance of city boundaries in estab-
lishing a commercial community. 72 The city as a government was sepa-
rated from the older perception of a city as an economic unit. And this
latter version remained the "oath" of the city throughout the prerevolu-
tionary period.
There remained throughout this period a rhetorical identification of the
Corporation with the commercial life of the city. 73 Petitions to the com-
617 4 Common Council 361-410.
61 7 Common Council 51-105.
61 See the Petition of Israel Harsfield, Timothy Harsfield, Richard Green, and other
Butchers, in Petition File, 1735 (N.Y. Municipal Archives and Records Center (MARC)).
The solution offered by the common council was to give resident butchers a discount rent to
their market stalls.
One reason why the city stopped trying to exclude nonresidents from the economic life of
the city was that a growing number of residents depended on the trade of the nonresidents.
Whenever restrictions against country people were too stringent, there would be complaints
that the regulation depressed business. See Petition of Francis Koffler, an innkeeper who
farmed the ferry, Petition File, 1766.
70 Seybolt, supra note 58.
7' N.Y. Historical Society, Collections 460-61 (1885).
72 4 Common Council 121.
7a See Petition of Sundry Persons dwelling and residing and being owners of the Houses
and Lots of Ground near and adjacent to Burling's Slip, Petition File, 1766; see also Petition
of the Inhabitants of Crown Street, Petition File, 1767.
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mon council continued to ask for varieties of commercial franchises and
privileges, which usually were justified by reference to the commitment to
commercial growth that was said to unite the members of the Corpora-
tion."4 And as Teaford suggests, there are some indications of a new
rhetorical concern for public health and safety regulation in the records of
the period.75 Still, the desire for regulation-whether public health related
or commercial-should not be exaggerated. Questions of "public," non-
commercial regulation were raised no more frequently before the common
council than were questions of commercial regulation. In both 1737 and in
1767 the minutes of the council record only nine entries that were even
arguably concerned with health and safety.
It is clear that by 1730 the Corporation of the city of New York could no
longer be defined as the embodiment of a commercial community. But
neither was it a public welfare agency on the order of a nineteenth-century
municipal corporation. What, then, was its proper business? How may its
concerns be described?
From the perspective of the citizens of the city who petitioned to the
Corporation the answer was unmistakable. The proper business of the
Corporation was the management, care, and disposal of its real estate.
Approximately 60 percent of the petitions sampled between 1730 and 1770
concerned the property rights of the Corporation. Between 1765 and 1767
the figure rose to nearly 75 percent. Petitioners petitioned for abatement
of their rents to the Corporation, 76 for a new lease, 77 for a right to farm the
ferry.7 ' The Reformed Protestant Dutch Church asked for a lot in the
commons because their present cemetery was full. 79 Merchants and
others would on occasion ask permission to clean or improve or repair or
"encroach" on some piece of city property, usually a pier or a slip.8 0 Most
of all, petitions to the common council revolved around requests to the
Corporation for grants of waterlots, grants of the land under water sur-
rounding the settled part of the city up to 400 feet beyond low water mark.
74 See Petition of Cornelius Van Vorst, Petition File, 1765.
71 See Petition of Joseph Simson, Petition File, 1755.
76 Petition of Francis Koffler, Petition File, 1766.
17 Petition of John Kelly (slaughterhouse), Petition File, 1736; Jocobus Rickman (room in
Commons for Brick Kiln), Petition File, 1747; Petition of Isaac Delameter (small house),
Petition File 1756; Petition of Nicholas Bayard (slaughterhouse), Petition File, 1767.
71 Petition of Cornelius Van Vorst, Petition File, 1766.
79 Petition of the Minister et al. of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, Petition File,
1766; see also the Petition of the Minister et al. of the English Presbyterian Church, Petition
File, 1766.
80 Petition of William Cornell, lessee of ferry, Petition File, 1737; Petition of sundry
individuals living near Clarke's Slip, id.; Petition that the encroachment made by Robert
Munro on the slip may be permitted to continue, as it is more convenient, Petition File, 1766.
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Petitioners "inclined to make considerable improvements ' 8 1 to those
waterlots asked for grants on terms discussed in detail in the next section.
But petitions for waterlots were frequently followed by counterpetitions
attempting to dissuade the council from making a particular grant to a
particular individual or set of individuals. Counterpetitions might argue
that the Corporation was violating its own customary procedures for
making grants, "That the Custom and Practice of this Corporation with
Respect to granting their Water Lotts, so far as the Petitioners are Ac-
quainted therewith, has ever been to give the preference to those, who
held the Lotts fronting the River."8 2 Or the counterpetition might set out a
claim of title in theory superior to that of the original petitioner(s).8 3 The
point is not that these petitions should determine our sense of the nature
of the eighteenth-century Corporation. Rather these petitions demon-
strate what part of the business of the Corporation provoked the
interest-more precisely, the self-interest-of its citizens. 4 It was the
property of the Corporation, not its economic regulatory powers nor its
public-welfare regulatory powers, that claimed the attention of eigh-
teenth-century New Yorkers.
The minutes of the common council also reflect a continuing preoccu-
pation with the management of the corporate estate. In both 1737 and in
"' See Petition of Jacob Brewerton, Petition File, 1765. See also the petition of Elizabeth
Richards and others, who presented on May 22, 1761:
".... that their houses front that part of the East River Commonly called Hunter's Bay
which was become a great Nuisance by the Settlement therein of all kinds of Garbage,
Filth and Dirt ... and that the water between the East and West Piers is become so
shallow as to render the same useless and greatly detrimental to the Health of the Petition-
ers ... and therefore conceived that the filling up the same Water Lots would greatly add
to the Ornament of the City as well as the conveniency of the Harbor, prayed that the said
Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty would be favourably pleased to grant to them the said
water lots so far into the said East River as the Present Wharfs on the East and West sides
extend under such reasonable rents etc. as should be thought fit and reasonable."
Elizabeth Richards was one of several active women merchants who actively sought and
secured waterlots in the mid-eighteenth century. See the Corporation Grant to Elizabeth
Sharpas, spinster, August 23, 1939, Grant Book B (MARC); see also Jean P. Jordan, Women
Merchants in Colonial New York, 58 New York History 412-39 (1977).
1 Petition of Owners of lots in Montgomery and Out Ward, Petition File, 1765. There
were, on the other hand, limits to the kinds of protests the council would entertain. Mr.
Brownjohn protested against the Corporation appropriating a waterlot fronting his lot for the
use of a slip, to which the Council responded, "this Board conceiving the same to be an
insolent and impertinent paper did thereupon unanimously resolve and ORDER that the
same be thrown under the table and the same is thrown under the table accordingly." 7
Common Council 27 (1766).
a' See the various petitions protesting the waterlots proposed to be distributed in "rotten
row" in 1766. Petition File, 1766.
4 See also the controversy over waterlots in 1753 conducted in the Independent Reflector
118-27, 151-56 (Milton Klein ed. 1%3) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as The
Independent Reflector].
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1767, property decisions were much the most important substantive area
of council concern. If we ignore the routine, nondiscretionary business of
the Corporation (entries into the minutes for warrants to the mayor to pay
the accounts and the salaries owed by the Corporation, entries warrant-
ing tax collections and auditing accounts, and entries for certification of
elections and the swearing in of officers), it is evident just how important
the corporate estate was in the work of the Corporation. In 1737 fully
one-third of all the discretionary entries in the minutes dealt with property
owned by the Corporation; in 1767 nearly 50 percent of these entries were
concerned with the management of the corporate estate. Neither trade
regulation nor public (noncommercial) regulation or other action ever
constituted more than 20 percent of the business of the council in'these
years. If the minutes of the common council are to be believed, it was the
concerns of a property owner that best defined the business of the Corpo-
ration of the city of New York.
This description of the Corporation at first glance may seem very simi-
lar to Teaford's picture of Philadelphia in the years prior to the American
Revolution. His Philadelphia was a city government that "neglected both
the traditional tasks of trade regulation and the newer duties of safety and
public works" in order to concentrate its efforts on managing corporate
properties. 85 In so doing, according to Teaford, the Corporation of
Philadelphia ignored its governmental responsibilities. Likewise, we
might say, the Corporation of the city of New York, as the government of
the city, devoted an inordinate amount of time to its corporate-its
private-property. But in New York that "obsession" with corporate
property did not lead to a separation of the concerns of the community
from those of the Corporation. A paradox? Why should New Yorkers
have regarded as their legitimate government an institution whose atten-
tion was firmly fixed on its own private property interests?
One could argue either that New Yorkers of the time wanted a lethargic
and neglectful government, or that it is we and not the Corporation of the
city of New York that have neglected its true governmental functions.
Both positions may be true. It may be that New Yorkers preferred a city
in which individuals were dependent on their own resources, preferred at
least a version of Warner's "private city." But without losing sight of the
commitment of city leaders to private economic growth, it is the other
perspective that demands our attention here, one that views the manage-
ment of a corporate estate as a mode of public planning and governance.
Such a perspective insists that we put aside later assumptions as to the
irreconcilability of property concerns with governmental action and of
1' Teaford, supra note 58, at 56.
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
what constitutes the proper business of a public institution. The Corpora-
tion of the city of New York spent most of its time managing its property;
yet it remained the government of the city.86 What we need to understand
is how property offered the city of New York a legitimated structure of
action within the constraints of Anglo-American political and legal theory.
B. Planning by Granting
In the 45 years between the reception of the Montgomerie Charter and
the beginning of the American Revolution, disposing of the waterlots of
the lower city was unquestionably the dominant property-related concern
of the officers of the Corporation.87 Indeed, insofar as property manage-
ment properly characterized the government of the prerevolutionary city,
a waterlot grant perhaps should be regarded as an appropriate symbol of
that government. The waterlots were the only new parcel of property
granted to the city under the 1730 charter, and it appears that their ab-
sence was the main reason why the members of the common council
decided to seek a new charter in the 1720s. The first time the "need" for a
new charter was mentioned in the minutes of the council was in 1722 after
Gerritt Vanhorne had petitioned the Governor of the province for a grant
of "all the land that may be Gained out of the East River [between Maiden
Lane Slip and the end of Wall Street] ... to extend to the Said River two
hundred foot with Liberty to Erect Buildings, Cranes, Stairs, etc. And to
Receive the Profits and Wharfage thereof." The Common Council re-
monstrated to the Governor as to "the great prejudice the Granting
thereof may be to the Publick in General and this Corporation in Particu-
lar," and then decided that it had better itself petition for a new charter
that would include a grant of all the land that might be gained out of the
harbor, plus "Such other Privileges Franchises and Immunities as are
Usually Granted to Cities and Towns Corporate in England.""' In every
86 In demonstrating that public purposes shaped the management of New York's corpo-
rate estate, all that might be shown is the exceptionality and isolation of New York City
within the world of eighteenth-century local government. It is possible that New York's
Dutch heritage separates the history of New York City from the rest of provincial America.
See Jan de Vries, Barges and Capitalism: Passenger Transportation in the Dutch Economy,
1632-1839, in 21 Afdeling Agrarische Geschiednis (Wageningen), Bijdragen 33-398 (1978).
But historians of English local government also stress the importance of corporate property
in the life of eighteenth-century municipal corporations. For a case study of a relatively
"activist" use of property see the discussion of Liverpool in Francois Vigier, Change and
Apathy (1970). The other, more common image of corporate lethargy and quiescence is
presented in R. W. Greaves, The Corporation of Leicester 1689-1836 (1970); and Malcolm I.
Thomis, Politics and Society in Nottingham, 1785-1835 (1969).
87 See, for example, 4 Common Council 25-211, for the years 1731 to 1734.
8 3 Common Council 271-78. The origins of this conflict begin in 1720, 3 Common Council
221.
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petition thereafter to the royal authorities the waterlots headed the wish
list of the Corporation. 9 And as soon as the new charter was secured and
confirmed, the council set about the difficult business of granting away the
lands under water and the right to develop the emerging waterfront of the
growing city. 90
Still, it might seem that a waterlot grant is a peculiar focus for a discus-
sion of the uses of a corporate estate in planning and governance. One
might in fact suspect that the process of disposing of the most valuable
property owned by the Corporation at nominal quitrents ought rather to
be regarded as the antithesis of active governmental planning. The dis-
posal of the waterfront of New York City bears a suspicious resemblance
to the disposal of the public domain by the federal government during the
nineteenth century, which, as every student of American history knows,
delivered up the development of the West to private speculator control.
And students of the history of New York City have usually judged the
waterlot grants made by the eighteenth-century Corporation in similarly
harsh terms, when they regarded them at all. John W. Reps, the leading
historian of American city planning, sees eighteenth-century New York
City as a prime example of an unplanned city. 9' George W. Edwards
concluded that the city acted "with utter disregard for the future" in
allowing its rich riparian rights to fall into the hands of private individu-
als. 92 Another historian speculates that "perhaps the government simply
anticipated New York's growth by abandoning in advance any influence
over it.
93
Historians have often viewed these grants as typifying the corruption of
the Corporation-an earlier version of the shame of the city.94 Relying on
a 1753 "expos6" in William Livingston's Independent Reflector they have
concluded that waterlot grants were nothing but a series of "shady land
deal[s] by which some local business- men, in collusion with the City
89 4 Common Council 5-8, 19-22.
o The centrality of waterlots in the plans of the Corporation is underscored by the fact
that in 1730 Van Home was bribed to withdraw his petition to the Governor with a promise
that when a new charter was obtained he would get a 400-foot lot instead of the 200-foot lot
he had petitioned for. See 4 Common Council 25. The promise was fulfilled in 1734. 4
Common Council 211. See also Corporation Grant to Cornelius Van Home, July 26, 1734,
Grant Book B (MARC). It appears that Van Home was the only grantee throughout the
prerevolutionary period to receive a lot that extended more than 200 feet into the river.
9' John W. Reps, The Making of Urban America 150-54 (1965).
Municipality, supra note 55, at 150.
9 Josef W. Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City Planning in Early Modem Europe 65
(1978).
9 Edwards, Municipality, supra note 46, at 150-51; Milton Klein, Introduction, to The
Independent Reflector 30; Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt 39 (rev. ed. 1970).
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Council, planned to get valuable shore- line property for a song.""5 A
letter with commentary in that paper revealed a series of transactions by
which council members themselves were to receive grants to waterlots at
a low consideration without public bidding, on the assumption that be-
cause the council members owned the lots fronting the waterlots they
therefore owned the preemptive right to purchase these waterlots
whenever the city decided to convey them. As Livingston noted, it was
"incredible" that a majority of the council "should join in so iniquitous a
Concession." After all, "Does Contiguity of Land infer a Right?" The
business of making waterlot grants was nothing but an institutionalized
abuse of power, a way for corrupt council members to "lavish, in man-
ifest Violation of their Trust, the Property of the City, to enrich and
gratify a few Individuals."19 6 To label it a form of city planning would be to
rob language of meaning.
Yet one may wonder. Those historians who have allowed the Inde-
pendent Reflector to shape their vision of the waterlot grants appear not to
have read the grants themselves. Neither have they considered the
significance of a later issue of the Independent Reflector in which a corre-
spondent argued that the situation revealed in the earlier issue was not an
exceptional abuse of power.
But further, Sir, excepting a few Instances, it has invariably been the Practice of
the Corporation, to grant the Water Lots to particular Petitioners, upon Terms
agreed on between them, and not at Vendue [public auction]. In these Grants, the
Preference has generally been given to the Proprietors of the Upland, contiguous
to the Water Lots.9 7
Livingston responded that although he would concede that perhaps the
petitioners were not acting improperly in relying on a "common Prac-
tice," still they had "no more Colour for pretending, that the Contiguity
of their Lands, entitles them to what belongs to the City, than to the
Lands of any adjoining Neighbors." The expectations created by a com-
mon practice did
indeed place the Conduct of the Petitioners in a more favourable Light; but render
that of the Corporation... the more inexcusable and unjust. Have former Corpo-
rations made a Practice of giving the Lands of the City, it should be an Inducement
to their Successors, to obliterate the Remembrance of those Transgressions, by a
more inviolable Attachment to their Duty. 8
Looked at from the twin perspectives of whig political theory and of a
Klein, Introduction, to The Independent Reflector 30.
The Independent Reflector 124.
97 Id. at 153.
98 id. at 155.
PROPERTY AS GOVERNMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 331
"Blackstonian" theory of exclusive property rights Livingston was
clearly correct in his general condemnation of the conduct of the Corpo-
ration. •" But neither whig political theory nor a theory of property rights
founded on the absolute power of a possessor to exclude accurately
reflected the legal world of eighteenth-century New York City. 00
Whether or not waterlot grant petitioners ought to have presumed that
contiguity created a legitimate interest in the real estate of the city, those
with land fronting waterlots certainly did make such a presumption. In
their view, sale by public auction would have constituted a deprivation of
their own property rights. Practically every successful petition for a
waterlot grant was premised on the fact that the petitioner's land fronted
on a waterlot.101
A long petition to the common council in 1765 put the case forcefully for
the propriety of a practice of private sale. Those who owned land fronting
the East River, wrote the petitioners, have looked upon their right to
purchase the contiguous waterlots as a practice of "long and almost in-
variable usage and custom:"
[They] have been so far enfluenced by that Consideration, as to look upon it, like a
Sort of unalienable Priviledge belonging to their Estates, and hence in their Trans-
fers from one to another, the Price and Value of those Estates, has been by that
means, proportionally increased.
The petitioners insisted that they did not mean to imply that the Corpora-
tion was "bound never to depart from a rule of this Kind;" they did,
however, insist that the council should "be tender of the Rights of Indi-
viduals" when the effect of deviating from the "rule" would be to "di-
minish the Value of every Estate that is now held, under this particular
Circumstance.' '102
In effect the petitioners argued that they had a property interest in the
water rights owned by the city, perhaps on the order of the right every
property owner has to prevent the existence of a nuisance on his or her
neighbor's property, or a right of first refusal. But we should be careful
not to make this expectancy interest appear more precise than in fact it
"9 See Klein, Introduction, to The Independent Reflector 1-50.
o Nor should it be seen as a direct and accurate reflection of the legal world of
eighteenth-century England. See E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1976); id., supra
note 32, at 328-60; Daniel Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law (1941).
01 Where it didn't, a grant of a waterlot was preceded by a grant of the contiguous land.
See for example the Release of Lot . . . to Anthony Rutgers, July 24, 1766, Grant Book C
(MARC) (of the land between high and low water mark) followed immediately by a Corpora-
tion Grant of the waterlot. Id.
102 Petition of Sundry Persons Owners & Proprietors of Lotts of Ground situate in
Montgomery and the Out Ward of the City of New York-fronting the East River, Petition
File, 1765.
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was. The Corporation had the power to appropriate a waterlot to public
uses-such as a public slip or dock-without offering any compensation
to the contiguous owner.1 3 Moroever, if the owner of the frontage was
unable or unwilling to take the waterlot on the terms set by the Corpora-
tion, the common council might transfer the right in the waterlot to an-
other, perhaps at public sale."° Indeed, it appears that the owner of the
frontage owned nothing personally; the interest was appurtenant to the
land he or she held. Even the petitioners quoted in the previous paragraph
conceded that their "priviledge" was inalienable and belonged to their
estates. 1
05
It is impossible to say whether the process of making waterlot grants
was corrupt or not. It is difficult even to decide what it would have meant
in the context of the general political culture of eighteenth-century New
York to call the process corrupt.10 6 We can assume that waterlot grants
were usually made to the rich and powerful of the city who in many cases
were also members of the common council. Still, the obligations imposed
through the terms of those grants were so severe as to make it unlikely
that anyone but a relatively rich person would have had any interest in
receiving a waterlot grant. More important, even a "corrupt" process
may succeed as a planning tool. The problem of governance that the
granting process was designed to solve was how to expand and develop
the port facilities of the city. To understand how waterlot grants effected
goals of commercial expansion and growth, we shall have to put aside
juridical questions of the guilt or innocence of corporate grantees and
corporate officers and look to the grants themselves: what they conveyed
away from the city and what they required of the grantees. 10 7
103 See entry 7 Common Council 27 (1766). Two petitions from the file of 1766 revealed the
fears of some individuals that if all the waterlots were granted away in Rotten Row (which
was being developed at that time) there would be no place left for any "public edifice' '-for
an exchange or a market; both petitions asked that the common council reserve space for the
use of the public.
104 See 4 Common Council 212 (1734), where the common council acted on the petition of
Jacob Goelet and Abraham Van Wyck, the executors of Andr6 Teller. They had petitioned
for and been granted a waterlot for the use of Teller's daughter. The grant had included a
covenant for "Docking Out the same within a Certain Limited time, which Neither the Said
Child nor we the Executors are Capable of performing." And the "privilege" of the grant
was transferred to Stephan Bayard.
105 Petition File, 1766.
106 See Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York (1968).
107 The following discussion of the provisions of the waterlot grants conveyed by the
Corporation is based on a reading of all copies of the grants held by the New York Historical
Society (NYHS) (about 50 in number) and a more selective examination of grants from the
official Grant Books (primarily from Books B and C) held in the Municipal Archives and.
Records Center (MARC). All grants of the Corporation, including those found in the New
York Historical Society, were recorded in full in the Grant Books of the Corporation (A
through F) and can be found arranged in chronological order.
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During the prerevolutionary period waterlots were granted out at in-
termittent and irregular intervals. In 1772 the Corporation made 29
waterlot grants. In five other years, 15 or more grants were made. But
most years the number of grants never exceeded three. s08 Usually grants
were made to groups of neighboring landowners. Either the city waited
for such a group of neighbors to come forward with a plan for the de-
velopment of a particular part of the waterfront, or the Corporation de-
veloped a plan and then solicited petitions for grants from contiguous
landowners, or the process involved elements of both alternatives. With-
out more research into the real estate concerns and plans of the city's
commercial elite, it is impossible to say where the original impetus for
making the grants came from. 109 In any event, the process culminated in a
grant which both memorialized the agreement between the Corporation
and the grantee and constituted the conveyance of the waterlot. The
conveyance was recorded in a "Grant Book" of the Corporation, and the
grantee received title to the land lying under the water of his grant.
Typically, a grantee received a lot that extended 200 feet into the East
River' 10 from "low water mark"' or (what was usually the same thing)
the border of the grantee's own lands. The breadth of the waterlot was
determined by the breadth of the grantee's frontage and ranged from a low
of 16 feet' 12 to a high of 116 feet." 3 Along with title, grantees uniformly
received the eventual right to charge rent for the use by merchants and
shipowners of the docks, wharves, and piers that would be constructed on
the lot. It was this potential rental value-the right to collect dockage,
wharfage, pierage, slippage, cranage, and so forth-that constituted the
main incentive to apply for a grant. Every conveyance of the city's
waterlots hinged on the transfer of the "profits and advantages" that were
appurtenant to the lots.
Quitrents for these grants, payable annually on March 25, could be as
little as one peppercorn or as much as eight pounds, five shillings. In
general the amount of the quitrent was figured on an equal per foot of
breadth rate for all grants made in a particular area at a particular time,
' See the "Location Index" in Corporation of the City of New York, Indexes to Water
Grants, 1686-1904 (manuscript at MARC).
' There is nothing in Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Merchant on the Eve of the
Revolution (1935), on speculation in city lands. For a later period see 2 Kenneth Porter, John
Jacob Astor, Business Man 910-52 (1931).
"l0 Until after the Revolution relatively few grants were made along the Hudson because
of the fear that ships moored along its docks might be damaged by ice floes.
I"l In the wake of the Dongan Charter of 1686, the Corporation had granted away most of
the lots between high and low water marks which had as a result been filled in. "Low water
mark" thus often meant the end of a lot bordering on the river.
112 Corporation Grant to T. Jeffreys, April 19, 1735, Grant Book B (MARC).
"' Corporation Grant to S. Farmer, July 24, 1766, Ellison Family Papers (NYHS).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
which rate might vary through our period from a low of four pence per
foot of breadth 14 to the high of three shillings per foot charged to a group
of grantees who received title to grants by Coenties Slip between 1772 and
1775."' The quitrents did not constitute the major cost to the grantees,
however; no one ever seems to have complained that his quitrent was too
high, although they regularly complained to the common council about
the burdensome nature of their grants. The actual cost to the grantee in
purchasing a waterlot was hidden in long, complicated, and highly for-
malized provisions of the grant.
Along with their lots and their potential profits, grantees accepted a set
of restrictive covenants which ran with the land and which determined the
precise ways in which the real estate would be developed. Satisfying the
terms of these covenants was the major consideration paid by grantees.
Almost uniformly the city required grantees to build two streets or
wharves, one at either end of the length of their lots and each parallel to
the river. These streets were to be constructed and paved by the grantees
at their own expense, were to be dedicated and applied to the use of the
public, and were to be maintained in perpetuity for the benefit of the
public and the city by the grantee, his assigns or heirs.
Additional responsibilities specific to a particular grant usually were
added. When in 1758 the Corporation granted to Oliver Delancey a large
lot on the Hudson in trust for the children of Sir Peter Warren, the deed
included covenants for the construction of a forty-foot wide wharf or
street on the inside boundary of the lot, a forty-foot wharf or street on the
outside of the lot, a fifteen-foot wharf to run from Cortlandt Street to the
river which would front a slip to be made and left by Delancey which
would itself be dedicated to public use, plus two posts which were to be
put on the latter wharf twenty feet from one another as an aid for boats
that would dock there. Moreover, it was stipulated that "all profits, fees,
perquisites, and Emoluments arising or accruing from the wharf or street"
running by the slip, "shall be taken and received by the Mayor Aldermen
and Commonalty" of the city. These covenants had to be satisfied within
seven years or the Corporation would repossess; the waterlot might again
become part of the estate of the Corporation. And until those terms were
14 Corporation Grant to Oliver Delancey, March 13, 1758, Delancey Deeds (NYHS) and
Corporation Grant to Henry Bogart, May 15, 1739, Grant Book B (MARC), Corporation
Grant to Elizabeth Sharpas, August 23, 1739, Grant Book B, MARC.
"I Corporation Grant to Hendrick Remsen, July 10, 1772, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS);
Corporation Grant to Peter Jay, July 10, 1772, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS); Corporation
Grant to James Van Cortlandt, Augustus Van Cortlandt and Frederick Van Cortlandt,
February 3, 1773, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS); Corporation Grant to Elizabeth Delancey,
April 29, 1773, BV Delancey Deeds, 1731-1784 (NYHS); Corporation Grant to Nicholas
Gouvernor, March 21, 1775, Gouvernor Family Papers (NYHS).
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entirely satisfied the children of Sir Peter Warren could not profit from the
development of their lot.116
Many grants included an obligation to construct a public space of some
kind in addition to the streets at front and rear which were a uniform part
of almost every grant. Frequently the grantee agreed to construct and
maintain a public slip-the space between two piers-to dredge it and
make sure that at all times it would be usable for deep water ships. All
boats were "to have free liberty to load and unload goods, wares, mer-
chandizes," at the slip. And the Corporation was to have "all profits,
fees, perquisites, and emoluments" arising from the use of the side of the
piers or streets that were directly contiguous to the slip.117 Other grants
insisted on the construction of an extra dock, a bulkhead, or a third street.
At times the size and complexity of the "public works" required by the
Corporation would be on such a scale as to necessitate joint enterprise by
groups of merchants or neighbors. This was the case in 1772 and 1773
when a number of merchants applied for waterlots on the east side of
Coenties Slip.118 The city insisted that any grant would be contingent on
the construction of a large and costly public "basin" which forced the
merchants to develop a formula for distributing the costs of the project.
"[I]f Grants ... should be obtained," wrote the applicants, "it would be
necessary for them ... to raise sundry large sums of Money in order to
comply with the Terms upon which such Grants would probably be made
and that as some of them ... would derive a greater Advantage from the
said Grants than others and of consequence ought to bear a greater pro-
portion of the Expence," it was decided that the task of ascertaining "the
several and respective Proportions of the whole Charge" should be given
over to arbitrators. These decided that both the costs of construction and
maintenance and the eventual profits (the wharfage) should be divided in
proportion to the breadth of the respective lots, and their report became a
contract binding the parties.' 19
The available records do not indicate how frequently grantees redis-
tributed the costs of construction among themselves through private
16 Corporation Grant to Oliver Delancey, March 13, 1758, Delancey Deeds (NYHS).
117 See for example, Corporation Grant to Henry Van Borson, July 23, 1737, Grant Book
B (MARC).
11 Corporation Grant to Hendrick Remsen, July 10, 1772, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS);
Corporation Grant to James Van Cortlandt, Augustus Van Cortlandt and Frederick Van
Cortlandt, February 3, 1773, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS); Corporation Grant to Peter Jay,
July 10, 1772, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS); Corporation Grant to Elizabeth Delancey, April
29, 1773, BV Delancey Deeds, 1731-1784 (NYHS); Corporation Grant to Nicholas GJouver-
nor, March 21, 1775, Gouvernor Family Papers (NYHS).
"I Arbitrators Report, bound with Corporation Grant to James Van Cortlandt, et al,
February 3, 1773, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS).
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agreements of this kind. But the very existence of such agreements dem-
onstrates the inadequacy of a simple equation of waterlot grants with
municipal corruption. Of course grantees applied for grants, anxiously
worked out financing arrangements that would allow them to meet the
terms imposed by the city, and usually abided by those terms for reasons
which presumably had something to do with long-term economic advan-
tage and gain. Grantees expected to benefit from their grants. And it may
be that many of the recipients of grants got their waterlots because of their
influence over and connections with the city council. But to look only to
the private cui bono without at the same time considering the benefit to
the city and its corporate entity is to lose sight of the calculated ways in
which grants of property could function as instrumentalities of govern-
mental action. The terms of the grants were shaped by the long-term
interest of the city in a developed and expanded waterfront. It was up to
the grantees to work out ways of meeting the terms set by the Corpora-
tion.
The control the Corporation exercised over granted waterlots was not
limited to setting affirmative and executory duties. Grants often included
restrictions on the timing of a development. 2 ' In some cases they re-
quired construction of a project at some relatively distant point in the
future, tying the actions of the waterlot holder to the future growth of the
city or to some other contingent event. In the case of the "basin" grants
of the 1770s the Corporation insisted that at the end of twenty years or as
soon as the basin was filled in, the grantees would have to build a third
street of 45 feet in width "so far as the right of the Mayor Aldermen and
Commonalty extends. 1 2 Thirty-three years earlier Henry Bogart had
similarly convenanted
that whenever hereafter it shall happen that three or more of the freeholders and
Owners of the Lotts of Land and WaterLotts in the Neighborhood . ..shall
Conclude and agree together to Erect and make wharfes and streets thereon and
wharfe out and fill up the Same for better Improvement thereof into Hudsons
River ... that he the said Henry Bogart ... at his ... own proper Cost Charge
and Expence shall wharfe out behind his said Ground and Lott . . . as far as the
Neighborhood shall wharfe out and fill up behind their own Lotts. 122
If the terms of the grant were fulfilled-that is, if the quitrent was paid
every year, the covenanted streets, wharves, and other public facilities
were constructed within the period of time set out in the deed, and all
"public" parts of the property were properly maintained-then the Cor-
12o Corporation Grant to Cornelius Vanhorne, July 26, 1734, Grant Book B (MARC).
121 Corporation Grant to Hendrick Remsen, July 10, 1772, NYC Deeds, Box 8 (NYHS).
122 Corporation Grant to Henry Bogart, May 15, 1739, Grant Book B (MARC).
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poration for its part covenanted that it would guarantee the good title of
the grantee and warranted that he or she should be able to have the "quiet
enjoyment" of the property in perpetuity."2 3 More pertinently to the pre-
sumed wants of the grantees, the Corporation also always covenanted
that "in consideration of [the grantee and his or her heirs and assigns]...
maintaining and keeping in repair the streets and wharfs before mentioned
[they] shall and lawfully may at all times and from time to time for ever
hereafter fully and freely have use enjoy take and hold to their own proper
use and uses all manner of wharfage cranage benefits advantages and
emoluments growing arising or accruing by or from the said wharf fronting
the East River."
But if the terms of the deed were not satisfied by the grantee, then the
document gave the Corporation a number of sanctions. Nonpayment of
rent would give the Corporation the right to distrain the goods and pos-
sessions of the grantee. Ten days after the due date for payment of the
quitrent, the agents of the city could enter onto the waterlot and "bear
lead drive and carry away" all the movable property of the grantee until
the rent had been paid. In some of the grants, moreover, the Corporation
retained a right of entry as a further direct sanction against an unsatisfac-
tory grantee. Under such a grant, a grantee who had not paid his rent or
who had not properly built wharves, streets, or whatever, within the time
period set out in the deed thereby gave to the Corporation the right to
"Reenter" the property "and the same to have again, Retain, Repossess
and Enjoy as their former Estate." Such a right of entry created a future
interest in the waterlot that was retained by the Corporation even as it
conveyed title to the grantee. And ultimately the fee simple received by
the grantee was made conditional on the satisfaction of the covenants;
failure by the grantee in meeting the Corporation's terms might result in a
forfeiture to the Corporation.1 4
But in most cases the Corporation evidently saw no need to create a
possibility of a forfeiture." 5 The fact that a grantee who had not fulfilled
the terms of his or her grant could not collect wharfage, slippage, pierage,
12 Such a warranty was uniform in grants made before the Revolution.
124 See Corporation Grant to Gerrardus Duyckinck, July 26, 1734, Grant Book B
(MARC).
25 The Corporation in 1734 began by granting its waterlots with conditional rights of
entry. But after 1735 most grants did not contain a right-of-entry provision. But see Corpo-
ration Grant to Abraham Mesier, July 4, 1760, Grant Book C (MARC); Corporation Grant to
Robert Leake, August 1, 1763, Grant Book C, (MARC); Corporation Grant to Nicholas
Roosevelt, March 7, 1765, Grant Book C, (MARC); Corporation Grant to Cornelius P. Low,
October 28, 1765, Grant Book C, (MARC). It appears that the right of entry became a
bargaining tool used by the city and grantees in exchange for larger grants (see the Low
grant), or lower quitrents.
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cranage, and other fees for the use by others of the facilities constructed
on the lot was sanction enough. Only a satisfactory grantee could profit by
his investment in a waterlot.
The waterlot grants made by the city allowed it to shape, control, and
profit from the development of the waterfront of the settled city, without
any obligation to finance that development. This was not, however, a
hidden form of "municipal socialism." Planning through the disposal of
waterlot grants by necessity would be an incremental process, dependent
in every instance on private market forces. Only a merchant who ex-
pected to profit quickly and substantially from investment in a waterlot
grant could be expected to seek or to accept such a deed. Under such a
system of control, the construction of waterfront facilities would not
move ahead of demand.
In the eighteenth century, as in every period of New York's history
prior to the rise of the skyscraper, the seaport of the city dominated the
shape of the city. Views of the city inevitably placed its harbor in the
foreground, and travellers' accounts dwelt on New York's shipping facil-
ities. Descriptions typically began with an account of the "multitude of
Shipping with which it [the city] is thronged,"' 2 6 and continued with a
comparison of the relative advantages and development of the ports of
New York and Philadelphia. Doctor Alexander Hamilton "saw more
shipping in the harbour" of New York," 7 and Peter Kalm thought "New
York probably carries on a more extensive commerce than any town in
the English North American provinces," although "Boston and Philadel-
phia however come very close to it."' 28 Travellers agreed that the port
was "a good one." Ships of any tonnage could lie in at the docks and
wharves, and the facilities were sufficient to meet the demand. All boats
could load and unload at dockside without the aid of lighters.' 29 More-
over, travellers and boosters alike thought that New York's salt water
port gave the city a definite advantage over Philadelphia's location on a
fresh water river which because it froze "During the Severity of Winter...
is locked up from all marine Correspondence with the rest of the World,
and thus, necessarily for several Months every Year, exposed to an al-
most total Stagnation of Trade." By contrast, "No Season prevents our
126 Thomas Pownall, A Topographical Description of the Dominions of the United States
of America (Being a Revised and Enlarged Edition of [A] Topographical Description of such
Parts of North America as are Contained in the (Annexed) Map of the Middle British
Colonies, & c. in North America) 43 [1784] (Lois Mulkearn ed. 1949).
127 Gentlemen's Progress. The Itinerarium of Dr. Alexander Hamilton. 1744, at 44 (Carl
Bridenbaugh ed. 1948).
,18 1 Peter Kalm's Travels in North America 124 (Adolph Benson ed. 1937) [hereinafter
cited as Kalm].
129 1 Kalm 133; Gentlemen's Progress, supra note 127, at 39.
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[New York's] Ships from launching into the Ocean and pursuing their
Traffick-The Depth of Winter scarce obstructs our Commerce, and
during its greatest Severity, an equal unrestrained Activity runs thro' all
Ranks, Orders and Employments." 130
But as of 1770, and indeed throughout the eighteenth century, shipping
tonnage arriving and clearing in New York City lagged well behind other
major colonial ports. 13 1 Carl Bridenbaugh and other historians have ar-
gued that New York's comparative and competitive failure resulted from
the policies of its government. The mayor and common council "failed to
provide their city with all the facilities it needed," ' 32 and "No town was
so poorly equipped to care for its shipping as New York." '33 They may be
correct in their condemnation of the actions of the city, although their
evidence is impressionistic and their judgment ultimately founded on the
misperception that waterlot grants were unrestricted gifts of property. But
the causal relationship between governmental land use planning and eco-
nomic growth and change remains a most controversial and largely un-
explored area of economic and historical research. 34 And it is beyond the
scope of this study to say whether New York's technology of planning
constituted the most efficient choice available.
What can be said is that the waterlot grants made by the Corporation
changed the face of the city. Over the last two-thirds of the eighteenth
century, the harborside facilities of New York were transformed. Two full
blocks were reclaimed out of the East River. The city had once ended at
Pearl Street; by the end of the century Front Street had become the
southeastern border of lower Manhattan.13 5 Perhaps the city would have
grown at the same or even a greater rate had some other form of planning
or port development been in effect. It is a certainty, however, that
waterlot grants were used, as they were designed, to provide New York
City with the streets, wharves, and port facilities of a growing seaport. 136
130 The Independent Reflector 436; 1 William Smith, The History of the Province of
New-York, 201-02 [1757] (M. Kammen ed. 1972) 1 Kalm at 133; Pownall, supra note 126, at
45.
3 Robert G. Albion, The Rise of New York Port 5 (1939).
132 Gentlemen's Progress, supra note 127, at 39; Konvitz, supra note 93, at 65.
W' Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness 328 (1955).
'34 The central text on the problem is J. Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth (1964).
'35 See the maps collected in I. Phelps Stokes, The Iconography of Manhattan Island
(1915-1928).
36 To say that the waterlot grants served to provide needed port facilities for the growing
city is not to say that they may not also have created new health hazards for a town which
had once prided itself on its healthful environment. See Cadwallader Colden to Dr. John
Mitchell, November 7, 1745 (writing in the wake of an attack of yellow fever on the city),
Colden Papers, vol. 8, NYHS Collections 329-30 (1934); see also The Independent Reflector
434-55 (on the "putrid stench" of Rotten Row).
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C. The Governmental Theory of a Waterlot Grant
It is important to underscore the peculiar nature of the waterlot grants
made by the Corporation in the years after the reception of the
Montgomerie Charter. If we look at them as the conveyances of a private
landowner, they seem to violate several fundamental tenets of the law
regarding real covenants. They specified affirmative obligations on the
estate of the grantee that not only radically limited the uses to which he or
she might put the lot, but also directed the actual shape of its develop-
ment. Insofar as the satisfaction of those covenants was ensured through
a clause granting the Corporation a right of entry whenever the grantee
should fail to meet the terms set out in the deed, they were effectively
transformed into conditions subsequent; and the grant became a grant of a
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent rather than a fee simple
absolute. But treatise writers from Coke on had emphasized that condi-
tions subsequent were not to be favored in the law. 3 ' And even when-as
was more frequently the case in the grants made by the Corporation-
only the right to take the profits from the waterlots was made conditional
on the performance of the covenants in the grant, those conveyances still
merged or "confused" covenants with conditions in ways that property
lawyers would have found profoundly unsettling.
38
Looked at as the planning tools of a municipal government the waterlot
grants are equally perplexing. Here we have the Corporation of the city of
New York with absolute ownership of the most important real estate in
the city of New York; it controlled a central resource for the commercial
development of the community. Yet it chose to act, if at all, through
indirection. The Corporation might have planned the design of the
waterfront of the city and then implemented that scheme, directly. In-
stead, it granted away the property and then compelled its grantees to
develop their grants according to Corporation directives. The structure of
action thereby created would appear to be an open invitation to ineffi-
ciency and corruption. And it is no wonder that historians of city planning
might have viewed the actions of the Corporation as a wholesale surren-
der of its proper responsibility.
Nor can it be argued that the Corporation negotiated the kinds of grants
it made because that was the only kind of grant any member of the com-
mon council could have imagined making. The Corporation of course
could have simply disposed of the waterlots and thereby given up control
over the development of the waterfront. Indeed at an earlier time, the city
31 See 4 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 127-28 (2d ed. 1832).
13 See the arguments of Alexander Hamilton and Robert Troup in Mayor v. Scott, 1
Caines Rep. 543, 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
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had made relatively unrestricted grants of the waterlots between high and
low water marks that it received under the Dongan Charter of 1686.' 39
And throughout the prerevolutionary period, whenever Corporation au-
thorities chose for one reason or another to sell an occasional lot out of
the commons, the grant memorializing the conveyance lacked any of the
covenants or conditions that characterized the city's waterlot grants. 140
One can only surmise that waterlot grants were drafted in their particular
form because the governing members of the Corporation intended to con-
trol the development of the waterfront of the city. But again, if control and
authority were what the Corporation of the city of New York was after,
why did it choose this way of achieving it? Liverpool, after all, provided
an alternative model of an English city that had developed its corporate
estate directly by building a great and usable waterfront facility.' 4'
We do not and probably cannot know why city authorities chose in the
early 1730s to adopt the policy of making waterlot grants to individuals
willing to develop their lots in accordance with the strict directives of the
Corporation. But it is possible to understand what made such a policy
attractive and plausible. The structure of action revealed in the waterlot
grants may constitute a unique and attractive form of public action in an
eighteenth-century political culture in which all direct forms of public
action were constitutionally suspect. Liverpool, the model for the
Webbs of an activist municipal corporation, stood alone throughout the
eighteenth century. Other English commercial cities, notably Bristol and
London, found it impossible to follow Liverpool's example and develop
their waterfronts directly. 42 By contrast, the use of land grants as plan-
ning tools had roots in an English planning tradition that stretched back to
the new towns created by Edward I in the thirteenth century.' 43 Waterlot
139 On September 7, 1692, the Corporation made grants of lots between high and low
water mark to William Morris, Hephanus Van Cortlandt and Dirrick Van Den Bergh. Each
agreed to pay one peppercorn per year quitrent and to construct and maintain one street
thirty feet in breadth on the inside of the lot. Failure to perform the latter covenant on time
would result in a fine of twenty shillings for every month's delay, but the profits were not
made contingent on the completion of the project. In fact, the city covenanted that the
grantees had an absolute right to the profits and that the Corporation would make good any
losses suffered by the grantees. Grant Book A (MARC). See also George Ashton Black,
Municipal Ownership of Land on Manhattan Island 21, 27 (1891), who argues that after 1686
the lots between high and low water mark from Wall Street to Beekman's Slip were sold at
public auction in fee simple absolute without the reservation of a quitrent.
40 See, e.g., Release of the Corporation to William Walderon, September 24, 1731, NY
City Deeds, Box 4 (NYHS); Counterpart of 33 year lease to Ann Aerison, April 24, 1771,
Grant Book C (MARC).
4' 2 Sidney Webb & Beatrice Webb, The Manor and the Borough 481-91 [1908] ("Eng-
land Local Government vols. 2-3," 1963 ed.); Vigier, supra note 86, at 40-43.
142 Webb, supra note 141, at 460-1 (Bristol), 690 (London).
,43 John W. Reps, Tidewater Towns 1-22 (1972).
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grants that covenanted action by their recipients offered the city a way to
initiate change without doing violence to some of the central tenets of
eighteenth-century political culture. Waterlot grants were a legitimate
form of governmental action. Their use demonstrated a form of govern-
mental power given to the Corporation through the property rights con-
tained in the Montgomerie Charter that was unavailable to the unchar-
tered local governments of eighteenth-century America.
In eighteenth-century terms the best answer to the question of what the
purpose of government should be would have been that government ought
to do little; its role was to make certain that others did as they ought to.
One could not separate public from private action. Just as a "public"
institution had "private" rights, so private individuals had public obliga-
tions. The primary function of government was to enforce the peace of the
community; to maintain the order of society by insisting that private
individuals fulfilled their public responsibilities.'"
There was, as a result, little that one could consider direct govern-
mental action or service. Governments did not act so much as they en-
sured and sanctioned the actions of others. The characteristic forms of
"public" action were not street cleaners or road-building crews, but
rather ordinances obliging residents to clean the portions of streets abut-
ting their houses or presentments against the selectmen of a town (or a
group of neighbors) for failing to maintain or repair a road or highway. 45
Or, in New York City's case, public action took the form of a lease or
grant of corporation property.
The problem of governance in New York City, as everywhere in pro-
vincial America, was to shift the burden of action to private individuals.
One useful way of reading the ordinances of an eighteenth-century corpo-
ration is as a way of organizing private action. New York City's ordinance
to pave and clean the streets, for example, had nothing to do with the
"bureaucratic" problem of providing a public service. Mobilizing an army
of public servants would never have occurred to the members of the
common council; indeed, it would have been definitive of their notion of
corrupt government. Rather, the ordinance was a list of things that
homeowners could or could not do in the care of their streets, in the care
of that portion of the streets that fronted their properties.46
' This argument is spelled out in greater detail in Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a
County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 20 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 282-329 (1976). For an examination of the dependence of whig-republican theory on the
existence of an active and virtuous public, see J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
(1975).
145 Maitland, Township and Borough (1898); see also Vigier, supra note 86, at 54-55.
146 New York City, Laws, Orders, and Ordinances (November 18, 173 1), c. 22; New York
City, Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, and Constitutions (1749), c. 14; New York City, Laws,
Statutes, Ordinances and Constitutions (1763), c. 14. See note 67 supra.
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Even when governmental action involved the city's own corporate es-
tate, the role of the city was usually limited to a supervisory and directive
one. If a slip had to be cleaned, the landowners whose property abutted
the slip would be ordered to clean it at their own cost. In 1737 a grand jury
presented the public pier near Fly Market as a nuisance because it was
"so narrow that [it] often proves Very dangerous as to Carts passing and
Repassing both in Respect to grown People as well as Children," and the
members of the jury ordered the residents living near the market to peti-
tion the common council for permission to enter onto the Corporation's
property in order to widen the pier. 141 When in the same year William
Cornell, the lessee of the ferry, complained that the disrepair of the mar-
kethouse at Clarke's Slip was cutting into his business by discouraging
"Country People" from coming to the city, he did not conclude his petition
as we might have expected by asking the Corporation to maintain its
property properly. Instead, he asked the common council to order the
neighbors of the markethouse to repair it (an order which was preempted
by a petition by those very neighbors who volunteered to enlarge and
improve the markethouse).148 No one, it seems, even contemplated asking
the Corporation to take care of its own property directly.
At one level, the insistence that action be conducted by private indi-
viduals might be regarded as a substitute for a nonexistent public bureau-
cracy. Public action depended on the participation of a local public. 149 But
that insistence was as deeply tied to the belief that government ought not
to bear the costs of action. Perhaps the most striking manifestation of that
belief from our perspective lay not in what we might consider local gov-
ernment at all but in the presumption in criminal courts throughout colo-
nial America that defendants ought to pay the fees and costs for their trials
irrespective of whether or not they were acquitted. 5 0 We can also see that
belief reflected in many elements of the practice of the common council of
the city of New York prior to the second half of the eighteenth century.
Virtually every order the council made was premised on the conviction
that whatever was going to be done the Corporation would not pay for it.
Lessees of the Corporation-whether of the ferry, the public docks, or
land in the commons-held their leases subject to their willingness to
assume all liability for repairs or improvements. 151 The very oath taken by
1'4 4 MCC 403 (The petition of the residents was, not surprisingly, granted.)
148 Petition File, 1737 (MARC).
149 A similar argument is developed for Massachusetts in William E. Nelson, The
Americanization of the Common Law 13-35 (1975); and in John P. Reid, In a Defiant Stance:
The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, The Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the
American Revolution (1977).
150 Julius Goebel, Jr. & T. Raymond Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York
731-48 (1944); Hartog, supra note 144, at 320, 326-27.
"I The responsibility of the lessee of the ferry for all repairs led to constant petitions
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a freeman made his obligation to avoid imposing costs on the Corporation
second only to his responsibility to maintain the property of the Corpora-
tion. 152
Indeed, one might argue that the estate granted in the charters was less
important to the Corporation as a way of generating revenue than as a tool
of governance that vitiated the need for revenue. Of course the corporate
property gave the city an income freed from the restrictions of de-
pendence on the provincial assembly, thus providing a partial and tempo-
rary substitute for tax revenues. But the waterlots and other parcels of
corporate property also offered city authorities the opportunity to act
without any costs of municipal administration. As we have seen, the
Corporation uniformly required waterlot grantees to build streets or
wharves at the front and at the rear of their holdings. These covenants
should be read as meaning exactly what they say. The city was not simply
reserving a portion of the granted lands for public uses, nor was it merely
assessing the costs of street construction. These covenants meant that
the city would do nothing, the waterlot holders everything. It was the
waterlot grantees who would build and finance the public streets by the
side of the harbor of New York City.
The government of New York was a government which acted by dele-
gation, a government committed to a policy of externalizing the costs of
action, yet, at the same time, a government lacking most of the powers of
coercion and enforced obedience of the modern state. Neither the
"watch," nor the constabulary, nor the sheriff and his deputies consti-
tuted what we would consider a police force. Compared to the monopoly
on legitimate violence of the modem positivist state, government at every
level in eighteenth-century America was relatively ineffectual. In this
regard the government of New York City was indistinguishable from
other local governments. Public action was possible only to the extent
that a government could enlist the support and involvement of a local
constituency. 13
asking for reduction or abatement on the rent in order to meet the costs of maintenance or
repair of the docks from which the ferry left. Frequently the Corporation granted those
petitions, and in a sense the Corporation did therefore "pay" for repairs. But the Corpora-
tion was far less concerned with the size of its revenue than with the avoidance of all direct
responsibility for action.
I.2 4 Common Council 121 (1731).
1.13 See for example, the Petition of the Vestrymen, Petition File, 1755 (MARC), who
asserted that the keeper of the almshouse did not perform the duties of his station and
behaved in a surly and abusive manner to justices of the peace and vestrymen. If he were not
fired immediately the vestrymen threatened that they would not attend to their monthly
meetings "with that Alacrity and Chearfullness as they would Willingly do for the Publick
Good."
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Dependence on the participation of a local public meant that most local
governments operated with a very limited range of objectives. Govern-
ments pursued consensus as the only legitimate basis for action; when
consensus was unachievable, governments did nothing. Others have
written of the committed and conscientious parochialism of local govern-
ment in the province of New York, and some historians have concluded
that all forms of government in eighteenth-century America sought to
preserve a consensually determined status quo.'" But different publics
might come to differing conclusions as to the proper sphere of public
action. And in New York the members of the common council could
legitimately-within the terms of the political culture-direct the actions
of the city towards change, planning, and development. New York City
was preeminently a commercial city, whatever ambiguities there may have
been in the definition of the role of government within that conception of
the community. Shipowning was widely dispersed throughout the popu-
lation of the city; 55 virtually every family in the city was involved in
seaborne commerce. The development of the waterlots of the city were
not merely for the benefit of a small elite. In effect the terms of the grants
provided a form of redistribution from the wealthy to the larger commu-
nity of the city, which would bear none of the costs of development. The
fortunes of nearly everyone in the small city of New York would ride on
the quality and the quantity of the city's harbor facilities.1 56 And while
William Livingstone thought that the Corporation's dealings in making
waterlot grants meant that council members would eventually "experi-
ence the Resentment of an injur'd People, at a Time when they are most
solicitous about the popular Esteem," 15 7 it may be that he was wrong. The
Corporation may have used its corporate estate in ways that accurately
reflected the desires of its constituents.
In any event, the property rights granted New York City through its
charters allowed it to achieve governmental objectives that were beyond
the reach of unpropertied local governments. Instead of mere sanctions
against failures of performance, the city could offer leases, licenses, and
154 See Patricia U. Bonomi, Local Government in Colonial New York: A Base for Repub-
licanism in Colonial New York Society and Politics 29 (J. Judd & I. Polishook eds. 1974);
William Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 76 Michigan L. Rev. 893-960 (1978); Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable King-
doms (1970); Sung Bok Kim, Landlord and Tenant in Colonial New York (1978).
' Bruce Wilkenfeld, The New York City Shipowning Community; 1715-64, 37 American
Neptune 50-65 (1977).
I56 The significance of shipping facilities to a city whose population never exceeded 22,000
in the colonial period would be of a piece with the significance to a modern university town
of the school's legislative appropriation or the level of student enrollment.
1-1 The Independent Reflector 156.
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grants to private individuals willing to implement various city-defined
goals. New York City did not itself build streets, fill in swampland, or dig
wells; the public works projects that characterized nineteenth-century
urban government would have been incomprehensible to the city fathers
of eighteenth-century New York. Yet it could act. Where a county court
could only indict a town or individual for failing to maintain a street or
bridge, New York's property gave it a way of building streets and bridges;
the property of the city allowed it to plan and initiate action without doing
violence to the basic premises of eighteenth-century governance.
The waterlot grants of New York City thus typify the singular govern-
mental authority of a propertied corporation. Their terms made possible a
form of capital investment and development without a reliance on the
exactions of the tax gatherer or the exertions of a public bureaucracy.
They suggest the possibility that even within the terms of a political cul-
ture opposed to publicly instituted change and innovation, a propertied
corporation could control the continuing evolution of the shape of a com-
munity. In a world of governance in which the enforcement of public
policy (indeed its very formulation) was prima facie corrupt absent public
consensus, in which instrumental public action was inherently suspect,'5 8
the waterlot grants of the city constituted a technology of public action
that was primafacie legitimate and proper. It was not a standing army or a
police force that gave effect to the decisions of the city government; it was
the hallowed operation of English property law. The fact that the Corpo-
ration held its property as a private landowner made it possible for the city
to delegate to private individuals major responsibility for the construction
of its commercial heart without at the same time abandoning control over
that process.
CONCLUSION
After the middle of the eighteenth century there are signs that the
political assumptions of local governance in America were beginning to
change. More and more governmental activity was made directly charge-
able to the New York City Corporation. In 1755 the common council made
a standing rule that whenever repairs to public wharves were necessary,
the aldermen and assistants of the ward where the wharves were lo-
cated should proceed immediately to contract out the work and charge
the costs to the Corporation.159 And by 1767 a group of merchants might
151 See John Phillip Reid, In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of "Arbitrary," the Su-
premacy of Parliament and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 Hofstra L. Rev.
459-99 (1977); Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (1968).
9 1 Stokes, supra note 135, at 197.
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petition the Corporation about the sorry state of Beekman's Slip with the
expectation that the common council would respond by appointing a
committee with power to correct the situation directly, placing the whole
cost on the Corporation. 160 Indeed, the growing dependence of the city on
the taxing powers of the provincial assembly because of the city's in-
creasing inability to finance its work out of corporate income may be one
indication of increased willingness to internalize within the government
the costs of action. 61
Perhaps the theoretical underpinnings of local governance in colonial
America were beginning to fall away. There is some evidence of what
might be called a bureaucratization of public affairs elsewhere. And there
are clear indications of a new dependence on public authority. 162
Yet the scope of public activity did not grow; there is no evidence of a
general reevaluation of the legitimacy of direct public action. The in-
creased willingness of the Corporation to assume the costs of maintaining
corporate property may rather indicate that the common council was
increasingly conscious of a problematic separation of the estate of the
Corporation from the general government of the city. After the Revolu-
tion, consciousness of that separation would grow, eventually becoming a
central obsession of the American law of municipal corporations. But in
the 1750s, 60s, and 70s the dichotomous relationship of public power and
private wealth was at most only a subterranean theme in the institutional
history of New York City. New York City continued to govern through its
corporate estate. Waterlot grants remained at the center of the city's
governmental business right up until the city was abandoned to the British
in 1776.
The waterlot grants of New York City were one solution to the problem
of how an eighteenth-century commercial city could develop its commer-
cial facilities. Such activity may be a prototypical example of the
"privatism" that we so deplore in modern life: the subsidization of private
gains by public agencies and the definition of social goals in terms of
private advantage. But from a less presentist perspective, waterlot grants
offered the possibility of achieving positive governmental goals at a time
when there was no theory of direct governmental action. How do you get
160 7 Common Council 77-79.
161 Edwards, Municipality, supra note 46, at 35, 190-205; it is important to note that after
1750 criminal courts also increasingly made the costs of trial a governmental responsibility.
Goebel and Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York, 731-748, Hartog, Public
Law of a County Court .... 326-7.
I See generally, Kenneth Lockridge, Social Change and the Meaning of the American
Revolution, 6 J. Soc. Hist. 403 (1973), Douglas Jones, The Strolling Poor, Transiency in 18th
Century Massachusetts, 8 J. Soc. Hist. 28 (1975), Hartog, supra note 144, at 282; James A.
Henretta, The Evolution of American Society, 1700-1815, at 119-57 (1973).
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something done if you do not know how or, rather, if you cannot conceive
of doing it yourself? You get someone else to do it for you. In colonial
America and in Georgian England most local governments could only get
those things done that had always been done, or that had at least always
been supposed to be done, since the only sanction available was punish-
ment for not acting. One cannot after all punish someone for not doing
what he or she was not obliged to do. On the other hand, a chartered city
with a substantial estate could use its wealth to achieve goals, to induce
change, even in the absence of a commitment to direct governmental
action. The promised reward of the waterlot (and its profits) gave the city
the power to coerce grantees to do things that they were not obliged as
citizens to do. And ultimately our interest in the practice of government in
eighteenth-century New York City is defined by that possibility of action,
by the ways in which the seemingly distinct public and private spheres
were united in the achievement of positive governmental goals.
